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Abstract 
 
Introduction 
The overarching theme of the dissertation is to examine the impacts of 
government assistance programs on the economic behaviors of disadvantaged groups 
such as low-income or single-headed households in the U.S. It is crucial to expand our 
understanding of how government assistance has helped them to overcome economic 
barriers to labor force participation or to expand household resources. My dissertation 
chapters primarily focus on the two largest government safety net programs: Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP). I show that public assistance programs play a pivotal role by 
interacting with economic choices made by vulnerable households, such as labor supply, 
health, or household expenditures. Exploiting the variation in specific aspects of welfare 
program or the changes made to program parameters, I study how the policies have 
altered the life circumstances and opportunities faced by disadvantaged households.  
   
Chapter 1. Exempt from Welfare Work Requirements? Opposing 
Effects Before and After Childbirth on Mothers’ Work 
Beginning in 1996, welfare recipients were required to work in order to receive 
benefits. Welfare recipients, however, were exempt from work requirements if they are 
new mothers with infants or at-risk pregnancy. The goal of this paper is to quantify the 
effects of welfare work exemptions on women’s labor force participation. I examine the 
pregnancy exemption and the age of youngest child (AYC) exemption, which account for 
90 percent of all exemption cases. Considerable between-state and within-state variation 
xii 
 
in program rules adopted after 1996 allows me to estimate a triple-difference in the event 
study ― 24 months before and after the event of childbirth. High labor force participation 
is detected in states with stricter exemption rules. When labor force participation is 
decomposed into employment and unemployment, however, I find opposing effects by 
the timing of the exemption relative to birth: mothers who are granted no exemption 
during pregnancy show more employment and lower welfare dependency after birth. In 
contrast, short exemptions after birth impose a burden on mothers with infants, resulting 
in more unemployment and higher welfare dependency. Although simple theory implies 
mothers would reduce working hours when they are exempt from work requirements, my 
paper suggests that the effect of work exemptions matters differently by its timing, 
because mothers face substantially distinct costs of working before and after childbirth. 
 
Chapter 2. Changes in Low-income Households’ Spending Patterns in 
Response to the 2009 SNAP Benefits Increase 
In direct response to the Great Recession, Congress passed the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in 2009. The ARRA included a 14 percent 
increase in Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits, which was the 
largest one-time increase since the program began. In this study, I focus on this plausibly 
exogenous jump in SNAP benefits to quantify its impact on participants’ consumption 
patterns in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Using data from the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey, I find a substantial increase in the total expenditures of SNAP 
household after the SNAP benefit increase compared to those of other low-income non-
SNAP households. Increases in total spending are strongly driven by the food and 
housing categories. Consistent with the theoretical framework, the increased amount in 
food expenditures for SNAP households is slightly less than the increased amount of 
SNAP benefit. Instead, I find that SNAP households redirect their expanded resources to 
other non-food categories. This paper makes two contributions in that it studies the most 
recent policy change and it investigates all spending categories beyond food expenditures 
in response to the SNAP benefit increase. Given that consumption is generally favored 
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over income as a measure of the well-being of the poor (Meyer and Sullivan, 2008), 
understanding household’s consumption response in every spending category to an 
increase in in-kind transfers helps assess the overall welfare effect of the policy.  
Chapter 3. Are Household Food Expenditures Responsive to Entry onto 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program? 
Direct evidence of SNAP’s ameliorative effect should be apparent in the food 
expenditures of these households, pre- and post-SNAP entry. Do food expenditures rise, 
fall, or remain stable in the months following program entry? Do SNAP dollars replace or 
supplement out-of-pocket spending? What other changes happen to a family around the 
time of SNAP entry? This paper delves into these questions by adopting an event-study 
framework to draw a month-to-month trend in food expenditures before and after SNAP 
entry. We use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the only panel dataset with 
measures of both household food expenditures and SNAP participation by month. Taking 
advantage of the PSID’s panel structure, we create an analysis sample identified by the 
month relative to the SNAP entry. We then use these observations to track trends in 
household food expenditures for the twelve months prior to and the twelve months 
following SNAP entry. Our findings suggest that the SNAP shields new entrants from a 
substantial fall in food expenditures. Even after controlling for demographic 
characteristics as well as time and state fixed effects, our event-study estimation reveals 
that total food expenditures show a stable and smooth trend in the months surrounding 
SNAP entry. This is found to be largely due to SNAP replacing a great share of 
households’ food budget after program entry. We also demonstrate that there are 
household shocks that co-occur with SNAP entry, such as new spells of unemployment or 
marital dissolution, suggesting that these shocks may trigger SNAP entry. 
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Chapter 1  
Exempt from Welfare Work 
Requirements? Opposing Effects Before 
and After Childbirth on Mothers’ Work 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Over the past few decades, one striking trend has drawn people’s attention: 
increased labor force participation of mothers with young children. Figure 1.1 illustrates 
that labor force participation has been steadily rising for all women with young children, 
but a drastic jump for single mothers is noticeable, exceeding the corresponding rate of 
married mothers after 1996. This period coincides with the initiation of welfare reform, 
when the 60-year-old government cash assistance program underwent a major 
transformation.  
One of the most radical changes made in the 1996 welfare reform is that people 
are now subject to mandatory work requirements to receive welfare benefits. Only three 
out of five recipients, however, are required to work (Table 1.1, column 2). Thirty 
percent of recipients are given exemptions (Table 1.1, column 3-4), the majority of which 
are granted during pregnancy or immediately after giving birth.
1
 Despite a sizable portion 
                                                        
1 Ybarra (2014) used 2006 administrative data from Wisconsin and found almost half of program entrants are new 
mothers with infants or at-risk pregnancy, who are not subject to work requirements. 42% of new mothers were 
pregnant at the time of application, and the rest applied for benefits shortly after giving birth. 
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of recipients exempt from work, little is known about the effect of these work exemptions 
provided directly around birth, when a mother’s tradeoff between market work and home 
production is most pronounced.  
Theoretical model suggests that mothers who are exempt from work requirements 
would reduce working hours accordingly. But responses could substantially vary by when 
they are exempt and how short/long the exemptions are. Furthermore, exemptions 
influence not only simple “work or not” decision, but also stability of employment and 
future welfare dependency.  
Hence, the goal of this paper is to examine the effects of welfare work exemptions 
on women’s work and welfare behaviors before and after childbirth.  My analysis focuses 
on two exemption policies: the pregnancy exemption and the age of youngest child 
(AYC) exemption. These make up 90 percent of all exemption cases. Exploiting 
considerable across-state and within-state variation in the length of exemption, I run a 
triple-difference in the event study. The three differences are pre- and post-exemption 
policy change (variation within state), strict and lenient states (variation between states), 
and the marital status of mothers (single and married).  
A sizable increase in labor force participation is detected in states with tighter 
exemption rules. I find that a mother not granted an exemption during pregnancy 
increases her labor force participation by 10 percentage points relative to a mother 
granted exemption during pregnancy. An AYC exemption shorter than 12 months 
generates an 11 percentage point drop in labor force participation right before birth, but 
eventually leads to a 13 percentage point higher labor force participation beginning four 
months after birth, compared to a mother granted an exemption longer than 12 months 
after birth.  
It is worth noting that a broad range of work-related activities, such as community 
service or vocational training, also satisfy work requirements. Consequently, looking at 
an aggregate pattern in labor force participation could mask to what extent the shift is due 
to actual employment. One possible interpretation could be that the increase in labor 
force participation in states with limited exemptions is mainly driven by more women 
searching for work and being unemployed while still being counted in the labor force. 
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Therefore, I decompose the aggregate labor force participation effects into changes in 
employment and unemployment. I find that the increase in labor force participation in 
response to the absence of exemptions during pregnancy is entirely driven by stable 
employment.  In contrast, limited AYC exemptions are associated with greater 
unemployment among mothers with infants. It indicates that strict pregnancy exemptions 
successfully increase the number of women employed, while strict AYC exemptions raise 
unemployment. This finding adds value to the existing literature by suggesting opposing 
effects of work exemptions immediately before and after childbirth, and points toward 
the conclusion that the timing of mandatory work matters substantially to mothers. 
I next investigate whether increases in work eventually reduce welfare 
dependency. Would tighter exemption policies lead more women to leave welfare sooner 
than would more liberal exemptions?  I find a stark difference in monthly welfare receipt 
trends between the two exemptions. The proportion of single mothers on welfare falls 
notably after childbirth in states that provide no pregnancy exemption. This implies an 
accelerated welfare exit enabled by higher labor force attachment in the pre-birth period. 
Conversely, single mothers with an AYC exemption shorter than 12 months show higher 
dependency on welfare. Collectively, these findings suggest that mothers face markedly 
different costs of working before and after childbirth, resulting in opposite behavioral 
responses to strict work exemptions. 
To my knowledge, five published papers examine the AYC exemption (Hofferth 
et al. 2002, 2005; Washbrook et al. 2011; Hill 2012; Herbst 2014), and none examines 
the pregnancy exemption. Hofferth et al. (2002; 2005) use the pre-welfare-reform period 
(1989−1996) and evaluate all policies requiring work and their associations with exit 
behavior. In line with my findings, they discover that a tighter AYC is associated with a 
higher likelihood of exiting welfare but also a speedier return to welfare. Other studies 
look at the post-welfare-reform period: Washbrook et al. (2011) and Herbst (2014) use 9-
month longitudinal data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study Birth cohort 
(ECLS-B) and exploit cross-state differences in the generosity of AYC allotments in 
2001, but do not make use of over time variation. Hill (2012) uses the June Fertility 
Supplement of the Current Population Survey between 1998 and 2008 to employ a 
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standard difference-in-differences strategy. All of the three papers find a strong impact of 
the AYC exemption: an AYC shorter than 12 months increases maternal work in the first 
year after childbirth (Washbrook et al. 2011; Hill 2012), and has negative effects on 
children’s cognitive ability (Herbst 2014). Yet, they are limited in identifying a mother’s 
month-to-month work status prior to and following the childbirth, which is critical in 
evaluating the AYC that comes into play at different months after birth across states.  
I improve upon existing studies by employing a more flexible measure of 
maternal employment as well as an event study methodology to closely map out the 
evolution of labor force participation. The Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) allow me to draw a monthly trajectory of maternal work by following the same 
mothers for as long as 48 months. Moreover, the SIPP provides detailed information 
about women’s work status―whether they are working, unemployed (without work, laid 
off, or seeking a job), or are out of labor force. This is a new contribution in that most 
studies explore work vs no work outcome, which may mask substantial dynamics within 
the labor force. Given that no prior study has examined the pregnancy exemption, another 
major contribution of this paper is that it is the first to do so. 
As a robustness check, I explore whether there is any endogenous response in 
women’s childbearing decisions that could affect their work behavior. A decreasing trend 
in childbearing is observed after the exemption becomes tightened, however, the effects 
are not statistically significant. I further investigate whether the pregnancy exemption had 
any unintended consequences on infants’ birth weights. Infants’ birth weights declined by 
10 grams after the elimination of the pregnancy exemption, but the effects are 
insignificant.  
Taken all together, this paper sheds light on a full range of maternal behavioral 
responses to welfare work exemptions. It expands our understanding on potential 
unintended consequences of the new policy interventions, which could arise when the 
policy fails to consider a mother’s different cost of working. 
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1.2 Institutional Background―Work Exemptions after 
Welfare Reform 
Work requirements are not new components: they did exist before welfare reform 
in the form of Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program, under which 
states were required to engage recipients in education, work, or training. Yet, states’ 
required work participation rate could be as low as 15% of non-exempt caseload. 
Furthermore, penalty for non-compliance was mild: welfare offices eliminated $65 per 
month (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). Individuals were exempt 
from JOBS if they had a child under age 3 (or 1 at state option) or if they were in their 
2nd or 3rd trimester
2
 of pregnancy. In addition, there were many other reasons for not 
having to work while on welfare. 
With the passage of the 1996 welfare reform
3
, all states were required to meet 
higher work participation rate
4
 targets by promoting welfare recipients to participate in 
work activities for at least 30 hours per week during benefit receipt.
5
 Meeting the work 
participation rate has been a primary measure of success of the new welfare program 
(newly named as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, TANF) for all states. 
Because caseload reductions can be used to meet the state work participation 
requirement, states often have attempted to maximize the measured work rate at the 
expense of actually helping recipients engage in work― by closing cases, thereby 
reducing the size of the state’s caseloads (Brookings 2002; Kauff and Derr, 2008).  
Exemption criteria also shrank substantially after welfare reform. One of the few 
exemptions remaining is the age of youngest child (AYC) exemption. Although federal 
law sets forth that single-parent families with a child under age 1 are not counted toward 
the work participation rate, there exists considerable cross-state variation regarding 
                                                        
2 Pregnancy is measured in trimesters, totaling 40 weeks. The first trimester is week1 through week 12 (about 3 
months), the second trimester is week 13 to week 27, and the third trimester spans from week 28 to the birth. 
3 The official name is the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). 
4 The work participation rate was set at 25 percent in 1997, which increased to 50 percent in 2002. 
5 20 hours for a single-parent family with a child under age 6. Higher hours requirements would apply to two-parent 
families. Bush administration reauthorized the TANF in 2002 and families were required to participate in work 
activities for a total of 40 hours per week, 24 hours of which should be direct engagement in work (either paid 
employment or community service jobs), and 16 hours of which in work-related activities (which could be defined by 
the states). 
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whether to require parents with a child younger than age 1 to work. Also, families are 
exempt from work requirements if there is any member with a severe disability or in poor 
health (e.g. pregnancy). Again, states were given wide discretion to design their own 
exemption rules and define specific criteria with respect to “young child”, “disability” or 
“poor health”. 
Some states have made changes to their exemption policies even after welfare 
reform by further tightening them or by eliminating existing exemptions. Figures 1.2 and 
1.3 summarize the variation across states and over time for 1996−2003, the study period 
of this paper.  
In Figure 1.2, it is evident that almost all states allowed pregnant women 
(including women with their first pregnancy) to collect benefits without fulfilling work 
requirements around the time of the 1996 welfare reform. The month of pregnancy when 
the exemption starts varies across states. 29 states eliminated the pregnancy exemption 
subsequently, which means pregnant women are required to work as long as they are 
capable. Only 15 states were left with any form of the pregnancy exemption in 2003.  
Similarly, in Figure 1.3, AYC exemptions longer than 12 months were the norm 
in 1996 across the country; however, 22 states shortened their AYC exemptions to be less 
than 12 months during the 1996−2003 period. By 2003, no states provided such a 
generous AYC exemption as pre-welfare reform, when a 36-month exemption was the 
most common allotment. 
Exploiting the enormous between-state and within-state variation in work 
exemption rules over 1996−2003, I investigate whether stricter work exemptions have led 
to an increase in women’s labor force participation, particularly around childbirth, and 
how they have affected subsequent TANF receipt. 
 
1.3 Conceptual Framework 
I present the canonical static model of labor supply with an individual’s well-
behaved utility defined over consumption (C) and time spent at home (L). I denote utility 
as 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝐶, 𝐿), which is assumed to be convex and monotonic in both arguments. Total 
time (T) can be allocated to hours at home (L) or working (H). The budget constraint is 
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𝐵 + (𝑤 − 𝑐)(𝑇 − 𝐿) − 𝐹 = 𝑝𝐶 = 𝑌, where B is a transfer from welfare (i.e. TANF), w is 
the hourly wage rate, p is the price of the composite consumption good, and Y is the total 
income. After giving birth, a woman incurs a positive childcare cost, c, for every hour she 
works, as well as a fixed child care cost F.
6
 For simplicity, I restrict my model to the first 
birth case. Therefore, c and F are zero in the pre-birth period, and both become positive 
in the post-birth period.
7
 I also ignore positive taxes (e.g. Earned Income Tax Credit) and 
other government assistances (e.g. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, 
also known as food stamps), Medicaid, etc.).  
I focus the following theoretical analysis only on single mothers to derive testable 
hypotheses. In practice, married mothers account for less than 10 percent of welfare 
recipients. In the empirical analysis, I use married mothers as a non-eligible comparison 
group, and indeed find null effects of welfare work requirements on this group. 
Figure 1.4 introduces two different periods: pre- and post-birth. Note that there 
are two budget constraints in each period. The non-welfare budget constraint is 𝐴𝐻̅̅ ̅̅  with 
a slope  – 𝑤, whereas the welfare budget constraint is 𝐵𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  with a slope  – 𝑤(1 − 𝜏) (𝜏 
indicates the benefit reduction rate for a dollar increase in income, with 0 < 𝜏 < 1). The 
vertical distance 𝐴𝐵̅̅ ̅̅  represents the TANF maximum benefit amount for households with 
zero earned income. Figure 1.4.1 only considers incremental childcare costs, c, for every 
hour of work. The slope of the budget constraint becomes flatter with a per-hour 
childcare cost after giving birth. Final budget set is 𝐴𝐵𝐷𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  in the pre-birth, and  𝐴𝐵𝐶𝐺̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   in 
the post-birth. Figure 1.4.2 considers both fixed and variable costs of childcare. The pre-
birth budget constraint is the same as that in Figure 1.4.1, but the post-birth budget 
constraint shifts down by the amount of the fixed childcare cost (= 𝐵𝐵′ = 𝐴𝐴′). This 
shift creates a discontinuous point when working zero hours. 
                                                        
6 Here I assume w>c. In general, TANF helps welfare recipients pay for child care usually in the form of vouchers that 
families can use to defray some or all of childcare cost from any legal provider. Sometimes, though, recipients pay part 
of their childcare costs, and the amount they pay increases with their income (The Urban Institute, 2006). 
7 The differences between first birth and higher-order birth cases would be that 1) F is not zero in the pre-birth period 
for higher order birth; 2) c will be scaled by the birth order of a child; 3) B will be greater for higher-order birth if the 
state allows TANF benefits to increase with the number of children. 
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Finally, I introduce work requirements8 in Figure 1.5. I assume that mother’s 
utility function changes after the birth such that the mother’s preference for hours at 
home (L) becomes stronger relative to her preference before giving birth. Accordingly, a 
relatively flatter utility curve (𝑢𝐿 < 𝑢𝐶) is observed before childbirth, which becomes 
steeper (𝑢𝐿 > 𝑢𝐶) following childbirth. 
The introduction of work requirements removes some portion of the welfare 
budget constraint. A welfare recipient is eligible for TANF benefits only if she satisfies 
the minimum number of hours required for work, denoted by 𝐴𝐻̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑚𝑖𝑛. This creates a new 
kinked budget constraint, 𝐴𝐶𝐷𝐸𝐺̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . 
Below, I describe two cases: 1) work requirements before birth (Pregnancy 
exemption); and 2) work requirements after birth (AYC exemption). For each case, I 
show how single mothers respond to work requirements by shifting their work and 
welfare behaviors.  
 
1.3.1 Pre-birth work requirements (pregnancy exemption) 
Women can choose to either work or stay at home prior to giving birth. I consider 
each option in Figure 1.5.1 and 1.5.2, respectively, and illustrate how pre-birth work 
requirements affect maternal labor supply and welfare receipt decisions. 
a) No work before work requirements (Figure 1.5.1): A single woman who 
initially used to work zero hours and fully depend on welfare benefits (𝑢1)  is better off 
by staying on welfare and supplying minimum hours (𝑢′1) than leaving welfare (𝑢"1). 
This implies that work required during pregnancy would increase labor supply at the 
extensive margin, inducing nonworking single women to enter the labor force. 
b) Work before work requirements (Figure 1.5.2): A single woman 𝑢2  has a 
flatter indifference curve than 𝑢1 and supplies some amount of working hours (point F) 
prior to the introduction of work requirements. She will increase her hours to the 
minimum level required (𝑢′2, point D) as a result of mandatory work requirements, but 
no more than that (𝑢"2). This prediction suggests that work required during pregnancy 
                                                        
8 The model with work requirements adopts elements similar to the model described in Moffitt (2002). 
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would increase labor supply at the intensive margin as well, leading working single 
mothers to supply more hours than they used to.  
In the pre-birth period, there is no obligation of child care, which makes the 
opportunity cost of working relatively lower compared to that in the post-birth period. 
Therefore, work required during pregnancy is expected to increase women’s labor 
supply―at both the extensive and intensive margins. Furthermore, both cases show that 
mothers continuously stay on welfare, which subsequently leads to a quicker welfare exit 
due to the consumption of lifetime limits. 
 
1.3.2 Post-birth work requirements (age of youngest child 
exemption) 
In my model, a mother strictly prefers staying at home after giving birth (𝑢𝐿 >
𝑢𝐶). This results in a much steeper indifference curve (𝑢3, 𝑢4) in the post-birth period, 
relative to the pre-birth period (𝑢1, 𝑢2). Therefore, I assume that all single mothers rely 
entirely on welfare benefits without participating in the labor force after birth if there are 
no work requirements. I describe two different schemes of childcare costs
9
 in Figure 1.5.3 
and 1.5.4, respectively, and illustrate how post-birth work requirements affect maternal 
labor supply and welfare receipt decisions. 
a) Variable childcare costs only (Figure 1.5.3): After the introduction of work 
requirements, a single mother is better off by exiting welfare and not fulfilling the work 
requirements (𝑢′3)  than she is by working the minimum hours required to qualify for 
welfare (𝑢"3). She ends up entering the labor force to support her family, but supplies 
fewer hours than what is required under TANF (𝑢′3, point F). In other words, a single 
mother is willing to trade off welfare benefits for non-monetary things such as staying at 
home and taking care of her newborn baby. To do this, she would seek a part-time job 
(𝐻 < 𝐻𝑚𝑖𝑛). Therefore, if work is enforced when there are competing demands of work 
and motherhood, it could lead to the increase in labor force participation, but not driven 
by stable employment. 
                                                        
9 Washbrook et al. (2011) find that the type of child care usage differs by the length of the AYC exemption. They show 
that long AYC is associated with more parent-only care and less informal non-center-based care providers. 
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b) Variable and fixed childcare costs (Figure 1.5.4): Adding fixed childcare 
costs in addition to incremental costs shifts down the entire budget constraint by the 
amount of the fixed costs, producing a new budget constraint, 𝐴𝐹𝐶𝐷𝐸𝐺̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . Fixed childcare 
costs lead to a situation where it is much harder for single mothers to get off of welfare 
from point B, leading to a higher dependency on welfare. Figure 1.5.4 demonstrates that 
women will exit welfare and work zero hours when work requirements are imposed after 
childbirth, revealing the deterrent effects of fixed childcare costs. This implies that a 
severe burden of child care in the post-birth period makes it more challenging for welfare 
recipients to transition from welfare to work, generating a “disconnected group”, who 
neither work nor are on welfare (point A).
10
 
In the post-birth period, mothers’ tradeoff between market work and home 
production is most pronounced, and the opportunity cost of working is relatively higher 
compared to that in the pre-birth period. Theoretical model predicts that work enforced 
shortly after birth is expected to increase women’s labor force participation at the 
extensive margin, mainly driven by part-time employment with an exit from welfare. A 
greater likelihood of welfare exit for mothers exposed to a restrictive AYC exemption is 
also found by Hofferth et al. (2002). But these mothers are highly likely to re-enter 
welfare eventually, as found in Hofferth et al. (2005). 
The predictions of the model guide an empirical test of my research question: do 
we see heterogeneous labor supply responses by the timing of work enforcement? Does 
the strictness of work requirements affect women’s future reliance on welfare? I provide 
empirical evidence on maternal labor force participation and welfare receipt by studying 
the pregnancy exemption and the AYC exemption, which apply on either side of the 
event of birth. The model predicts that single mothers would increase working hours as 
well as entry into the labor force as a result of their state having no pregnancy exemption. 
However, a strict AYC exemption would induce single mothers to enter the workforce 
but work far less hours that what is required at minimum. Accordingly, it is predicted that 
a strict AYC exemption would extend the period on welfare because the increase in 
earnings from temporary jobs is unable to offset the loss of welfare benefits.  
                                                        
10 Perhaps, these mothers may rely on other government transfers, which are outside the model. 
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1.4 Methodology for Estimating the Effects of Welfare 
Work Exemptions 
I employ an event study framework (Jacobson et al., 1993) to depict a monthly 
trajectory of maternal labor force participation around the event of childbirth. I run a 
triple-difference event study estimator by exploiting three of the principal attributes of 
TANF work exemptions: 1) pre- versus post-implementation of strict exemption policies; 
2) strict versus lenient states; and 3) marital status of mothers. By doing so, I obtain a 
detailed picture of labor force participation pattern across states, policy timing and 
mother’s marital status.  
 
1.4.1 Difference-in-Differences (DD) in the Event Study 
I start by estimating a simple difference-in-differences (DD) in the event study 
where the two differences are 1) pre- versus post-strict exemption policy (identified by 
the states that tightened the policy), and 2) strict versus lenient states. The DD analysis 
allows me to see heterogeneous labor supply responses by the strictness of exemption 
rules and by the timing of work requirements.  I estimate equation (1) for single mothers 
and married mothers, separately: 
(1)  𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖  + ∑ 𝛿𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑚 = 𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖) 
𝑚=24
𝑚=−24
 
+ ∑ 𝜋𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑚 = 𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖) 
𝑚=24
𝑚=−24
∙ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡  +  𝛼 ∙ 𝑋𝑠𝑡 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 
 
The outcome of interest is 𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡, which takes a value of one if a mother, i, in 
state, s, is in the labor force during month, t. Other outcomes studied in subsequent 
analyses include indicators for employment, unemployment, and TANF receipt. 𝐵𝑖 is the 
event month of childbirth to a mother i. Thus, 𝑚 counts months relative to the event of 
birth, which range from −24 to +24. 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 is 1 if state, s, ever implemented a strict 
exemption policy and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡  is an indicator of whether month, t, occurs after a strict 
exemption policy has come into effect in state, s. Therefore, the interaction between 
12 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡 is 1 if state, s, implemented a strict exemption policy during month, t. 
To control for state-specific characteristics and year-specific shocks, I include state 
(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 ) and year (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) fixed effects. Also, the time frame of the study was a period of 
substantial transformation of welfare and other social policies as well as unemployment 
rates. Therefore, I adjust for state characteristics (𝑋𝑠𝑡 ) that changed differentially over 
the study period such as the unemployment rate, the maximum TANF and SNAP benefit 
amounts for a family of three, the maximum refundable EITC credit, and state child 
support enforcement expenditures. I cluster standard errors at the mother-birth level.
11
 
The vector of coefficients,  𝜋𝑡, captures the difference in the outcome between a mother 
living in a state where strict exemption is in effect and a mother exposed to lenient 
exemption during month t. Theory predicts 𝜋𝑡  to be positive, implying that a mother 
would participate in the labor force more if she lives in a state with a stringent exemption 
policy. Here, an implicit assumption is that strict requirements have their full treatment 
effect instantly upon being introduced.
12
 
 
1.4.2 Triple Differences (DDD) in the Event Study 
The goal of implementing a triple difference (DDD) in the event study is to test 
whether the DD estimates are meaningful only for women who are receiving TANF. In 
other words, the DDD analysis allows me to check whether heterogeneous responses by 
the strictness of exemption rules and by the timing of work requirements are only 
pronounced by TANF receiving mothers, but not driven by non-recipients.   
Actual TANF receipt data would bias the estimates with a selection by excluding 
mothers who decided not to apply or who decided to leave welfare based on welfare 
rules, including the exemption policy. Alternatively, marital status is widely used as a 
proxy for welfare eligibility, and serves to define the treatment group in the broader 
                                                        
11 As a robustness check, I cluster at the state level, which is the level of the treatment, but the results remain 
substantially similar. 
12 A reasonable question is whether state TANF administrators are aware of, understand, and enforce the rules upon any 
changes. Pingle (2003) contacted TANF administrators in 16 states to inquire about these issues. State officials 
indicated that awareness and enforcement of AYC are widespread. Furthermore, the administrators knew immediately 
the length of the current AYC, and explained that it is easily applied by caseworkers to exempt mothers from the work 
requirements (Herbst, 2014). 
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welfare literature.
13
 Hence, the estimates can be interpreted as an intent-to-treat estimate 
of the exemption policies: I use “eligibility,” but not actual “treatment” to estimate the 
effects of welfare work exemptions. This strategy also avoids the empirically important 
issue of systematic measurement error of welfare receipt in survey. Therefore, I compare 
mothers who were single when the exemption policy is in effect
14
 with always married 
mothers in this study
15
.  
It is worth noting, however, that some married women in the sample may have 
received benefits from TANF since married mothers comprise 10 percent of TANF 
recipients. In other words, marital status does not perfectly predict TANF eligibility. In 
that sense, estimates from this study may underestimate the actual impact of TANF 
exemption policies and may be thought of as a lower bound (to the extent that married 
women can still benefit from TANF and single women may not receive benefits from 
TANF). Figure A1.1 presents TANF participation trend for all women in the analysis 
sample, and the heterogeneous patterns by marital status and by birth-order of a child. 
Keeping this in mind, I estimate a triple-difference estimator in equation (2): 
(2)   𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖  + ∑ 𝛿𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑚 = 𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖)  
𝑚=24
𝑚=−24
+ 
+ ∑ 𝜋𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑚 = 𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖)  
𝑚=24
𝑚=−24
∙ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡  +  ∑ 𝛼𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑚 = 𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖) 
𝑚=24
𝑚=−24
∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑚 = 𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖) 
𝑚=24
𝑚=−24
∙ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡 ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡  +  𝛼 ∙ 𝑋𝑠𝑡  +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 
 
The three differences are 1) pre- versus post-strict exemption policy (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡); 2) 
strict and lenient states (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠); and 3) single and married mothers (𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡). The 
vector of coefficients of interest, 𝜃𝑡, is the monthly estimate of the treatment effect of 
strict exemption policies for single mothers relative to married mothers for each month t 
around the event of childbirth. Theory predicts 𝜃𝑡 to be positive during month t in which 
                                                        
13 Married women with children or single women without children often serve as comparison groups. (e.g. Meyer and 
Rosenbaum 2000, 2001; Kaushal and Kaestner 2001; Kaestner, Korenman and O’Neill 2003; Kaushal, Gao, and 
Waldfogel 2007; Hill 2012) 
14 I define a single mother i using the marital status reported during pregnancy for the pregnancy exemption analysis, 
and the marital status reported after childbirth for the AYC exemption analysis. This alleviates concerns of endogenous 
selection to marital status because it is measured simultaneously at the initiation of each exemption.  
15 Results are similar when I define single mothers as those who were always single for all months before and after 
childbirth, not residing with parents or a partner. 
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the exemption takes effect, implying that a strict exemption increases labor force 
participation of single mothers. Furthermore, it will not be significantly different from 𝜋𝑡 
in equation (1), if there is no heterogeneous response for married mothers. The 
identification assumption, implicit in the estimator in equation (2), is presented in section 
8. 
 
1.5 Data and Measurement 
1.5.1 Data: Survey of Income and Program Participation 
To measure the monthly evolution of labor supply before and after childbirth, it is 
essential to know the exact timing of childbirth as well as a fine measurement of the 
mother’s work status. The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is the 
natural choice, since it contains detailed information on all these critical measures. The 
SIPP is a nationally representative longitudinal data set, following respondents for up to 4 
years in each panel.
16
 The SIPP also uses a relatively short recall period of 4 months. 
Moreover, the SIPP has a large sample size and includes a high proportion of low-income 
households compared to other national panel surveys. Numerous studies have used the 
SIPP to examine the effects of government assistance programs or specific policy 
changes targeted to low income households (e.g. Fairlie and London 1997; Barrow 2007; 
Mazzolari 2007; Blank and Matsudaira 2014). 
I use the 1996 and 2001 panels whose reference periods cover 1996 to 2003
17
, a 
period starting from the passage of welfare reform until its aftermath had been stabilized. 
Five U.S. states (Maine, Vermont, Wyoming, North Dakota, and South Dakota) are not 
uniquely identifiable in the SIPP, so observations from these states are dropped. For all 
analyses, I use individual weight measured at the last wave during the panel. 
                                                        
16 The 1996 panel is approximately 48 months in length (12 waves), whereas the 2001 panel is 36 months in length (9 
waves). Response rates shrink over the life of the panel: in the first wave of the 1996 panel, the response rate was 92%, 
but by the final wave 4 years later, it fell to 65%. The 2001 panel had an 87% response rate in its initial wave, and a 68 % 
across the full panel. 
17 The reference period of the 1996 Panel is from December 1995 to February 2000, and that of the 2001 Panel is from 
October 2000 to December 2003. Thus, the 7 months from March 2000 to September 2000 are not covered in the 
analysis.  
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Lastly, I obtain state TANF policy data from the Welfare Rules Database of the 
Urban Institute, which is widely used in the welfare literature (e.g. Washbrook et al. 
2011; Hill 2012; Herbst 2014). 
 
1.5.2 Analysis Sample for Women’s Labor Force Participation 
To construct the study sample, I identify every woman aged 18 to 45
18
 who gave 
birth during the panels. There are a total of 78,888 mother-by-birth-by-month 
observations in the sample, consisting of 2,463 mothers and 2,570 mother-births 
(meaning that some mothers had more than one birth during the panel). After identifying 
mothers with the month of birth
19
, I track their labor force participation in the 24 months 
leading up to and the 24 months following childbirth. All observations more than 24 
months away from a birth are dropped. Note that not all women have information for the 
full 24 lead and 24 lag months because women give birth at different points over the 
course of the SIPP panel. Whether I can observe 𝑚 = 𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖 , 𝑚 ∈ [−24,24] for a 
woman only depends on when the birth falls in the SIPP panels, which is unlikely to be 
manipulated by women. Therefore, variation in m across mothers is not correlated with 
unobserved factors that affect women’s labor force participation. Thus, the unbalanced 
panel feature employed in my analysis is not a threat to identification. 
Month of birth (𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖) is available for all observations since it is how women in 
the sample are identified. Consequently, the sample size is larger for months around the 
event of birth and gradually declines as the observations move farther away from the 
month of birth.  
 
1.5.3 Measurement of Labor Force Participation 
TANF defines “work” as labor force participation (U.S Census Bureau, 2002). 
The 1996 law sets forth primary work activities that can count toward the work 
                                                        
18 Women younger than age 18 are omitted in light of states’ stipulations on teen parents: they are deemed engaged in 
work if they are enrolled in school and work toward the high school degree (Table 1.1 column 5). 
19 The policies that I study here could affect the probability of observing a birth in the data. In Section 8.1, I show that 
there is no measurable change in fertility in response to different exemption policies across states. 
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participation rates: 1) paid or unpaid work; 2) vocational training; 3) job search
20
; and 4) 
providing child care to others. These work activities are broad in the sense that they 
include not only regular work, but also other types of activities that make individuals 
“job-ready”. By 2002, almost two-thirds of TANF recipients who met their work 
requirements did so by working full- or part-time jobs in the public or private sectors that 
are not subsidized by TANF or other public programs. Participation in all other categories 
was low (The Brookings Institution Policy Brief, 2004). 
Therefore, I use an indicator of being in the labor force as my main outcome. A 
woman is counted as in the labor force if she worked, was with a job, laid off, on leave, 
or searching for a job during the reference month
21
. She is out of the labor force if she 
had no job, no time on layoff, and no time looking for work all month. I break labor force 
participation down into employment (working or with a job all weeks during the 
reference month) and unemployment (reports any time without a job due to layoff or job 
search). 
 
1.5.4 Descriptive Evidence on Labor Force Participation 
To present a descriptive picture of women’s labor force participation around 
childbirth, a simple event study specification is estimated: 
(3)    𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑚 = 𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖) 
𝑚=24
𝑚=−24
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 
𝛽𝑖  are individual fixed effects and 𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑚 = 𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖)  is a set of indicators for 
months relative to the event of birth (𝐵𝑖), where m ranges from 24 months before to 24 
months after. When drawing descriptive plots, I omit the 12
th
 month prior to birth as a 
reference group so that the 𝛿𝑡 coefficients map out the time path of changes in labor force 
participation relative to the level a year before the birth. 
                                                        
20 The act of seeking employment, or preparation to obtain employment, including life-skills training and substance 
abuse treatment, mental health treatment, or rehabilitation activities (Congressional Research Service, 2012). 
21 In the SIPP, there is an indicator for whether a mother attended schooling or training because social services or a 
welfare office paid for, referred, or sent her. But, this variable does not distinguish between schooling and training. 
When I cross-tab this indicator with labor force participation variable, 75 percent of them are recorded as being out-of-
labor-force and 25 percent being in the labor force. 
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Figure 1.6 panel A depicts the overall labor force participation trend for all 
women in the sample. Labor force participation starts to decline from 9 months prior to 
childbirth and then rebounds after giving birth. Strikingly heterogeneous patterns are 
observed by marital status. Panel B reveals that there is a more drastic dip and leap 
around birth for single mothers, while the rates for married mothers stay relatively stable. 
The dramatic drop in labor force participation implies that a large share of single mothers 
withdraw from the work force around childbirth. The path after the birth seems plausible 
in that single mothers will have to return to work sooner than married mothers, since they 
are likely to be the only earner of the household
22
. Breaking down by birth order, panel C 
shows that the fraction of single mothers working right up to birth is pretty much the 
same across birth orders, around 65 percent. On the other hand, the fraction of their 
married counterparts who are working right up to the birth is much lower if they already 
have one child (from 85 percent to 65 percent). 
 
1.6 Results: The Impact of the Pregnancy Exemption 
Pregnant women with no child are eligible for TANF, in which case the 
enrollment is conditional on receipt of medical documentation of pregnancy. Pregnant 
women can be exempt from work and states vary in their pregnancy exemption rules: 
some exempt later in the pregnancy (from the third trimester or for the last month), some 
exempt early in the pregnancy (from the second trimester), and others do not exempt for 
pregnancy at all. In this section, I define strict pregnancy exemption as having no 
pregnancy exemption. 
In this section, I explore the heterogeneous effects by the strictness of TANF 
pregnancy exemption on women’s labor force participation. Furthermore, I decompose 
labor force participation into employment and unemployment in order to assess which is 
the main factor that drives the changes in the labor force participation patterns. Lastly, I 
document the effects on welfare receipt as well to uncover any potential consequences on 
future welfare dependency. 
                                                        
22 In this analysis, single mothers are defined as women who are unmarried, divorced, widowed, or separated and reside 
with no senior members and no partner in the household. 
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1.6.1 The Impact of the Pregnancy Exemption on Labor Force 
Participation 
Figure 1.7 exhibits women’s labor force participation response to the pregnancy 
exemption. As the arrow indicates in panel A, the month in which a divergence in labor 
force participation occurs coincides precisely with what the policy dictates for the target 
group. Across all months surrounding childbirth, single mothers who live in states with 
no pregnancy exemption are more likely to be in the labor force compared to their 
counterparts who are exempt from the second trimester. The gap in labor force 
participation starts to open up exactly at the initiation of the second trimester. 
Interestingly, this trend is not observed for the married mothers in Panel B. 
Figure 1.8.1 presents difference-in-differences (DD) event study estimates for 
single mothers (panel A) and married mothers (panel B). The dashed line with triangle 
markers represents changes in monthly labor force participation in lenient states, 𝛿𝑡 from 
equation (1). The solid line with diamond markers shows changes in labor force 
participation in strict states, 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡 . The difference between these two lines, 𝜋𝑡 , is 
depicted by a dotted line at the bottom. Panel A shows that the DD for single mothers 
becomes positive from approximately the second trimester of pregnancy. The positive 
DD estimates are significantly different from zero starting from two months before giving 
birth and up to 4 months after. In contrast, the DD estimates are essentially zero for 
married mothers, which ensures that married mothers are a well-defined comparison 
group. 
Figure 1.8.2 plots the DDD estimates, the coefficients on the triple interaction 
term, 𝜃𝑡 , from equation (2). It is the relative difference between single mothers’ DD 
estimates and married mothers’ DD estimates. The DDD estimates resemble the DD 
estimates for single mothers because those for married mothers are essentially zero. 
These estimates provide supportive evidence on the effect of the pregnancy exemption 
policy. If a single mother lives in a state with no pregnancy exemption, she is more likely 
to participate in the labor force―particularly around childbirth―compared to a single 
mother who is exempt during pregnancy. Table 1.2 confirms that the DDD estimates are 
indeed positive and statistically significant starting from the last trimester to 
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approximately a quarter after birth, consistent with Figure 1.8.2. In addition to showing 
the magnitude and significance for each month, I implement a joint test of significance in 
Table 1.3. A joint test of significance for months directly around childbirth has a p-value 
of 0.10 with an average estimate of 10 percentage points. Taken together, these results 
suggest that the pregnancy exemption accounts for differences in labor force participation 
directly around the event of birth between single and married mothers. 
  
1.6.2 The Impact of the Pregnancy Exemption on Employment 
and Unemployment 
Labor force participation combines employment and unemployment. Hence, an 
aggregate shift in labor force participation masks the extent to which the observed pattern 
is driven by employment versus unemployment. To uncover the effects, I run the same 
specifications, with the outcomes of employment or unemployment. Employment is 
defined as working or being with a job for all weeks during the reference month. 
Unemployment contains everything else, including temporary attachment, layoff, or job 
search.
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Figure 1.9.1 presents the DD estimates for a single mother’s employment. If she 
lives in a state having no pregnancy exemption, she is more likely to be working or 
continuously attached to a job around birth compared to her counterparts in a state with 
the pregnancy exemption. The parallel figure for married mothers is not presented here, 
as the DD estimates for married mothers are indistinguishable from zero for all months 
along the time line. Figure 1.9.2 presents the DDD estimates. These resemble the DD 
estimates for single mothers, providing further evidence of zero effect on married 
mothers. With a significant joint test result, the figure confirms that the absence of the 
pregnancy exemption leads to a higher rate of working and employment starting from the 
last trimester. It is worth noting that point estimates are all positive along the time line 
although they are not precisely estimated except for directly around childbirth.  
                                                        
23 Out-of-the-labor force is different from unemployment. Unemployment occurs when people are without work and 
actively seeking work. Out-of-the-labor force group typically is comprised of students, homemakers, or people in 
military, who are either unwilling or unable to engage in the workforce. 
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I omit the plots for unemployment because the DD estimates for both single and 
married mothers are not significantly distinguishable from zero. This suggests that the 
overall labor force participation changes in response to the pregnancy exemption are 
indeed driven by employment. 
 
1.6.3 The Impact of the Pregnancy Exemption on TANF 
Receipt 
Using the monthly program participation information available in the SIPP, I also 
display the monthly TANF receipt pattern by the strictness of the pregnancy exemption. 
Interestingly, Figure 1.10 reveals that the monthly TANF receipt pattern diverges after 
childbirth between the two types of states. The difference is zero in the pre-birth period, 
but a greater increase in welfare receipt after childbirth is evident for single mothers with 
the pregnancy exemption compared to single mothers with no pregnancy exemption 
available. Together with the previous finding of increased employment, this finding 
suggests that work activities enforced before birth actually lead to favorable work 
outcomes and declining dependence on government assistance afterwards. On the other 
hand, single mothers who opt out of the labor force during pregnancy with the help of the 
exemption may suffer from penalties from labor force withdrawals, signaling a lack of 
commitment. This could trigger a higher reliance on welfare as witnessed in Figure 1.10. 
The pattern is consistent across all birth orders (results not shown). A flat line at zero for 
married mothers in Panel B again ensures that the effects decidedly originate from 
TANF. 
 
1.7 Results: The Impact of the Age of Youngest Child 
(AYC) Exemption 
New mothers represent a large share of TANF entrants (Ybarra, 2014), in which 
case TANF enrollment is conditional on receipt of a birth certificate. Federal TANF 
guidelines allow states to provide benefits to mothers with children under one year of age 
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without imposing work requirements. Because states have flexibility in setting TANF 
rules, the duration of the work exemption for new mothers varies considerably across 
states. The age of a mother’s youngest child determines the length of the exemption after 
birth, which varies from 0 months (i.e. no exemption) to 3, 4, 6, 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 
months. The most common AYC exemption is 12 months (about 50%), as can be 
expected from federal rules, followed by 3−4 months and 36 months24. I define an AYC 
exemption to be strict if it is less than 12 months. In this section, I quantify the 
heterogeneous effects by the strictness of the AYC exemption on women’s labor force 
participation as well as on employment, unemployment, and TANF receipt. 
 
1.7.1 The Impact of the AYC Exemption on Labor Force 
Participation 
In Figure 1.11, single mothers noticeably respond to the AYC exemption policy 
while married mothers do not. The month in which labor force participation rates return 
to the same level of 9 months before birth is exactly when a mother hits the month 
corresponding to her state’s AYC allotment. It is also informative that the pre-birth trends 
are not distinguishable from each other between the two kinds of states, confirming that 
the AYC influences mothers’ labor supply only after birth, when the exemption becomes 
effective. This figure contrasts sharply with Figure 1.7, the parallel plot for the pregnancy 
exemption. In Figure 1.7, labor force participation starts to diverge before birth in 
response to the pregnancy exemption. 
Figure 1.12.1 presents the difference-in-differences (DD) event study estimates 
for single mothers (panel A) and married mothers (panel B). Labor force participation for 
single mothers with an AYC exemption shorter than 12 months (solid line with diamond 
markers) exhibits a sudden dip one month prior to birth and then jumps 4 months after 
                                                        
24 Concerns may arise that these mothers could also benefit from the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which 
guarantees 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave. But, the act has garnered widespread criticism for covering only 
about half of all women in the workforce (Berger and Waldfogel, 2004), and only a fifth of new mothers (Ruhm, 1997). 
Acs and Nichols (2007), using 2004 Current Population Survey data, found that those who use FMLA coverage are 
most likely to be professional, salaried workers with higher earnings and education (U.S. Department of Labor, 2001). 
Therefore, the uniform consensus is that the FMLA has disproportionately excluded low-income women. Ybarra (2013) 
discovered that new-mother welfare participants use TANF in a similar way to how other mothers use FMLA or paid 
leave in Wisconsin, which provides evidence related to a lack of employer-provided paid leave. 
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birth. This sudden leap at the 4
th
 month is notable given that the most common AYC 
length in the strict states is 3–4 months (76%). The DD estimates are negative 
immediately before giving birth, but become positive continuously from the 4
th
 month 
after birth, although they are not statistically significant. The DD estimates are not 
distinguishable from zero for married mothers and even become negative after birth, 
moving in the counterintuitive direction.  
Figure 1.12.2 plots the DDD estimates (coefficients on a triple interaction term, 
𝜃𝑡, from equation (2)). The DDD estimates fall right before birth but become positive and 
statistically significant during the post-birth period—approximately from 4 months after 
birth. The strong effects in a longer-term post birth are presumably driven by the negative 
DD estimates for married mothers, making the DDD estimates inflated from a year after 
childbirth.  
Table 1.4 confirms that the DDD estimates are indeed positive and statistically 
significant from a quarter after birth, consistent with Figure 1.12.2. The drop in labor 
force participation right before childbirth in strict states could potentially be due to 
anticipation by single mothers, who change their work behavior and opt out of the work 
force after learning that they will have to return to work shortly after childbirth. In Table 
1.5, a joint test of significance shows that a strict AYC exemption decreases labor force 
participation right around childbirth by 4 percentage points. The average effect of a strict 
AYC exemption in the post-birth period is an increase in labor force participation by 13 
percentage points. These estimates are well within the range of those from previous 
studies: Hill (2012) finds that no AYC exemption increases full-time work by single 
mothers by 23 percentage points compared to an AYC exemption of 12 months or longer. 
Washbrook et al. (2011) reports that long AYC exemptions reduce maternal work at or 
before 4 months by 7 percentage points, which is sustained intact to 9 months after birth. 
 
1.7.2 The Impact of the AYC Exemption on Employment and 
Unemployment 
I estimate the same specifications for employment and unemployment outcomes, 
separately. Figure 1.13.1 reports the DD estimates for single mothers’ employment. It 
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shows the opposite trend from the parallel figure of the pregnancy exemption (Figure 
9.1): single mothers are less likely to be working or stably with a job around childbirth 
when the AYC exemption is short. The DDD estimates in Figure 1.13.2 confirm lower 
employment in strict AYC states, suggesting that single mothers reduce their amount of 
work or job attachment even before giving birth, once they realize that they are subject to 
a quick return to work after giving birth. Figure 1.14 supplements this argument by 
assessing unemployment changes, suggesting that single mothers are employed unstably 
or are engaged in activities such as job search, training, or community service.
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decomposition exercise, together with the previous finding of a sudden drop in labor 
force participation before childbirth, implies that it is highly possible that rigid work 
requirements imposed shortly after birth may bring about a long-term impact on single 
mothers’ unemployment. It could be attributable to the maximized conflict between 
employment and childrearing for mothers, which enormously increases the opportunity 
cost of working relative to the pre-birth period. 
It is also noteworthy that the statistical significance of single mothers’ labor force 
participation as well as employment and unemployment patterns found above are 
primarily driven by first births (results by birth order not shown). This is likely due to the 
fact that many states’ AYC exemptions are applicable for first births, but are generally 
reduced or eliminated for subsequent births (state policy data from the Welfare Rules 
Database; Herbst 2014). 
 
1.7.3 The Impact of the AYC Exemption on TANF Receipt 
The monthly TANF receipt by the strictness of the AYC exemption is presented 
in Figure 1.15. Although the confidence intervals are overall wide, single mothers living 
in states with a restrictive AYC exemption exhibit a higher fraction of TANF receipt 
from pregnancy up to one year after childbirth. This pattern is observed for all birth 
orders, suggesting that work requirements enforced when mothers are balancing the 
competing roles of work and motherhood may lead to more dependency on welfare. 
                                                        
25 For employment and unemployment outcomes I do not present parallel plots for married mothers because the DD 
estimates are essentially zero for them. 
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1.8 Robustness Check and Further Analysis 
1.8.1 Any Endogenous Response of Women’s Fertility? 
I assess a potential mechanism through which mothers’ labor force participation 
could be affected by welfare work exemptions: Fertility. Mothers could endogenously 
make their childbearing decisions in response to the exemptions available to them. For 
instance, if they are exempt from work for a longer span of time before or after giving 
birth, this would make having a child less costly within the relevant subpopulation. 
Moreover, mothers potentially could space the timing of births in a way that they can 
collect the benefits continuously without having to work for an extended period of time. 
Using the National Vital Statistics Birth Data from 1991 to 2002, I collapse all 
U.S. births by state, year, and marital status in order to compare average general fertility 
rates
26
 by states’ exemption policies and by marital status. I specify a triple-difference 
estimation in the event study framework, where the event is defined as the year of the 
exemption policy change from lenient to strict in switch states. By presenting the DDD 
estimates, I test whether any difference in general fertility rates observed between switch 
and no-switch states after adopting a strict exemption is mainly driven by single mothers. 
Figure A1.2 reports the DDD estimates for 5 years before and after the AYC 
exemption policy change, which are hardly distinguishable from zero. It is worth noting 
that the point estimates show a decrease by 5 births per year per thousand childbearing 
women after the AYC exemption became tightened, which is a sizable magnitude, albeit 
imprecisely estimated. I conclude that there is not enough power to detect the impact of 
the AYC exemption on general fertility rates of welfare recipients before and after the 
policy change.  
The same story applies to the pregnancy exemption, as shown in Figure A1.3. 
Similarly, fertility rates decrease by 3−5 births after the pregnancy exemption is 
eliminated; however, I fail to reject the zero effect due to large confidence intervals. 
These findings are also consistent with the existing literature, where the dominant 
                                                        
26 The general fertility rate (GFR) is the number of births per thousand women of childbearing age (15−44). Thus, it is 
essential to have information on the number of women of childbearing age. I obtained the number of childbearing age 
women from IPUMS-CPS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series-Current Population Survey) and counted the 
number by state, year, and marital status in order to construct population estimates. 
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conclusion is that the effect of welfare reform on fertility is uncertain (e.g. Joyce et al. 
2004; Kearney 2004; Smith 2006). The fertility analysis suggests that we cannot decide 
whether welfare work exemptions would promote or discourage mothers’ subsequent 
child bearing.  
 
1.8.2 Indirect Consequences on Infants’ Birth Weight? 
Using birth weight information available in the National Vital Statistics Birth 
Data, I investigate whether strict enforcement of work during pregnancy has any 
unintended consequences on infants’ health. With the same identification strategy 
adopted for fertility analysis, I compare relative differences in infants’ birth weights 
between strict and lenient states before and after the elimination of the pregnancy 
exemption, by mothers’ marital status. Figure A1.4 reports the DDD estimates, revealing 
no measurable impact on infants’ birth weight. The point estimates decline by 10 grams 5 
years after the removal of the pregnancy exemption, but are not statistically significant. 
This null finding on infants’ health aligns with Washbrook et al. (2011), who find no 
effects of the AYC exemption on duration of breast feeding nor on the number of well-
baby visits, although they do not assess infants’ birth weight per se. 
 
1.8.3 Are the Two Exemption Policies Varying Independently? 
Any correlation between the two work exemptions could lead to a case in which 
the effects of these exemption policies cannot be separately estimated. Firstly, since my 
identification strategy partially relies on the timing of exemption policy changes from 
lenient to strict, one may be concerned about any overlap in the timing of changes across 
the two exemptions. I address this issue in Figure A1.5. Switch states identify the cross-
year, within-state variation in the exemption policies while no-switch states are in the 
fixed effects, picking up the aggregate trend. Approximately 80 percent of mothers in the 
analysis sample live in the 37 states that switched one or both exemption policies, while 
20 percent live in the 14 no-switch states. Out of the 80 percent of the sample which 
identifies my estimates, 76 percent lived in states where only one exemption policy 
switches with the other exemption policy remains unchanged. Only 6 states out of the 37 
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switch states change both exemptions simultaneously, and this corresponds to 6.4 percent 
(80% * 8%) of the study sample. Therefore, the overlap between the two exemption 
policies is negligible and they vary independently enough that it makes sense to think 
about them separately. 
Secondly, I assess whether there is any interaction between the two exemption 
policies in a way that the effects of one exemption policy differ by the strictness of the 
other. To address this issue, I estimate the same triple-difference specification in the 
event study, equation (2) separately by the strictness of the other exemption policy. I find 
no evidence of differential effects (results not shown), which ensures that my estimated 
effects for one exemption are not confounded by the other exemption. 
 
1.8.4 Are Other TANF Policies Changing Simultaneously? 
One further difficulty may arise because a state’s choices of TANF program 
parameters may be correlated with one another. The work exemption is only one aspect 
of TANF. Hence, it is challenging to disentangle the independent impact of provisions in 
the TANF package and attribute any effects specifically to the work exemptions. 
Therefore, an additional identifying assumption is needed: between-state and within-state 
variation in the exemption policies should be orthogonal with variation in other welfare 
policy parameters. Possible TANF policies established after welfare reform which could 
also affect labor force participation include the minimum hours required for work, family 
cap, full sanctions, and welfare lifetime limits.
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Indeed, I find that states that adopted strict exemption policies are also strict in 
other dimensions of welfare policy. For example, a state with a short AYC exemption or 
no pregnancy exemption is more likely to terminate the benefits as a penalty for non-
compliance (i.e. full sanction) rather than to reduce the benefits (i.e. partial sanction), 
more likely to impose a cap on TANF maximum benefits, and more likely to have a 
shorter lifetime limit. Hence, estimates of this study could be overestimated to the extent 
                                                        
27 Currently, about 23 states have implemented some type of a “family cap” or “child exclusion” policy, which denies 
the increase in welfare benefit amounts after the birth of another child. Under the “full sanction”, benefits are 
terminated as a penalty for failure to engage in work, whereas benefits are reduced under the “partial sanction”. Moffitt 
(2003) provides an excellent review of the rules and structure of the TANF as well as comparison of TANF with the 
historic AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) program. 
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that other TANF policies also affect mothers’ labor force participation decisions toward 
the same direction in conjunction with work exemption. 
However, I make use of one particular feature of the exemption policies: that they 
become effective at a specific month during pregnancy or after giving birth. None of the 
other policies necessarily come into effect in the months proximate to childbirth. Welfare 
recipients could alter their work decisions in any month when the rule is likely to bind. A 
key component of my findings is that the effects visibly appear at two months before 
childbirth in response to the absence of the pregnancy exemption. The effects emerge at 
four months after childbirth in response to the short AYC exemption, which is precisely 
the month when the exemption expires in 80% of strict AYC states. If these results were 
due to other welfare policies, then we would not see the changes in mothers’ work 
behavior at months when the pregnancy or the AYC entitlements begin or expire. Figure 
A1.6 shows the triple-difference estimates for four other TANF policies, discussed above, 
which are expected to have a strong impact on recipients’ work. Positive DDD estimates 
reveal that strict policy is associated with higher labor force participation. Yet the effects 
do not emerge at certain months surrounding childbirth, nor significantly estimated along 
the months before and after the childbirth.  
 
1.9 Conclusion 
Welfare reform transformed the longstanding cash assistance program, by tying 
welfare benefits more strongly to work. States were given block grant funding from the 
federal government to design their own TANF programs and achieve high work 
participation rates among welfare recipients.  
In this paper, I shed light on the effects of the two most prevalent exemption 
policies which apply to mothers who are expecting a baby, or mothers who just gave 
birth. These policies vary considerably across states in terms of the length of the 
exemption. Exploiting not only cross-state but also cross-year variation in the post-
welfare reform period, I explore mothers’ labor supply responses to the exemption 
policies, from labor force participation to employment and unemployment. Furthermore, 
I closely examine the monthly trajectory of welfare receipt by the strictness of exemption 
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to address whether the policies achieved their goal of moving people off of welfare to 
work.  
I discover a sizable impact on labor force participation, strongly driven by single 
mothers. The absence of the pregnancy exemption induces more women to work or be 
attached to the workforce from 2 months before birth, and this impact continues until the 
first quarter after giving birth. In contrast, work required shortly after birth causes 
withdrawals from the labor force before childbirth and a higher likelihood of 
unemployment around childbirth. These exemptions are also found to predict future 
dependency on the TANF program. 
TANF is the only employment program in which getting participants into paid 
employment is not a key measure of success (Schott and Pavetti, 2013). Therefore, it is 
unclear whether severe work requirements imposed as a condition for getting cash grants 
successfully engaged recipients in work. My study suggests that the rigidity of work 
requirements during a period when family responsibilities are pressing can make 
vulnerable single mothers further withdraw from the workforce. Or, they seek temporary 
employment, which hardly continues to a stable attachment to the workforce, thereby 
triggering more dependency on welfare. 
A widely accepted agreement is that work should be a key element of government 
assistance programs. Yet, prescriptive work requirements imposed on a mother with a 
young child may give rise to mere labor force “participation”, but not actual 
“employment”. By delving into welfare work exemption policies that have been studied 
little, I quantify a full set of behavioral responses, which is pivotal for understanding the 
potential costs and benefits of these new interventions. This paper offers useful insights 
into the optimal structure of TANF work exemption rules to better support vulnerable 
groups to actively engage in the workforce. Well-established work requirement and 
exemption policies can have a long-lasting impact, helping these groups to eventually 
achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency. 
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Table 1.1: Distribution of TANF Recipients by Work Participation Status 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fiscal 
Year 
Work 
Required 
Disregarded1) Exempt2) 
Deemed engaged  
in work 
Sanction3)/ 
Tribal work4) 
Child under  
12 months 
Disabled, in poor healt
h or pregnant 
Single parents with child u
nder age 6/ Teen parents5) 
FY98 58.3 3.3 8.4 16.8 12.2 
FY99 55.2 3.5 9.2 13.9 17.2 
FY03 61.7 6.1 8.6 12.9 10.7 
FY07 60.6 3.3 11.7 13.5 9.7 
FY09 61.6 1.5 11.1 12.6 11.0 
FY10 59.9 1.8 10.4 14.6 11.2 
FY11 59.1 1.9 9.8 14.9 11.8 
Notes : 1) “Disregarded” means that the TANF family is not included in the calculation of the work 
participation rate; 2) “Exempt” means that the individual will not be penalized for failure to engage in work 
(i.e., good cause exception); 3) Benefits are reduced or terminated for families under sanction as a penalty, thus 
they are disregarded from the calculation of work participation rates until the sanction is removed; 4) Work 
participation rates are not applicable to tribes; 5) Single parents with a child under age 6 engaged in work 
activities for at least 20 hours per week and teen parents who participate in education are deemed engaged in 
work 
 
Source: TANF Annual Report to Congress, Administration for Children and Families (ACF) Archives, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 
FY98: 2
nd
 Annual Report to Congress Table 9:19 (http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-
reports/annual2/tan19995.pdf) 
FY99: 3
rd
 Annual Report to Congress Table 10:19 (http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-
reports/annual3/annual3.pdf) 
FY03: 7
th
 Annual Report to Congress Table 10:28 (http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-
reports/annualreport7/Appendix/TANF_7th_Report_Appendix.pdf)  
FY07: 9
th
 Annual Report to Congress Table 10:28  
(http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ofa/ar9appendix.pdf) 
FY09: Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of TANF Recipients, Fiscal Year 2009, Table 27 
(http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/resource/character/fy2009/tab27) 
FY10: Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of TANF Recipients, Fiscal Year 2010, Table 27 
(http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ofa/appendix_ys_final.pdf) 
FY11: Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of TANF Recipients, Fiscal Year 2011, Table 
27 (http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ofa/appendix_fy2011_final_amend.pdf)
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Table 1.2: Triple-Difference Estimates of the Pregnancy Exemption on Labor Force Participation Around Childbirth 
         
Month-relative-to-birth 
7 months 
before birth 
6 months 
before birth 
5 months 
before birth 
4 months 
before birth 
3 months 
before birth 
2 months  
before birth 
1 month 
before birth 
month  
of birth 
Panel A: Months Before Birth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
DDD Estimates -0.005 -0.007 0.025 0.069 0.070 0.104** 0.103** 0.117*** 
 
(0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) 
Mean of Labor Force 
Participation (%) 
66.7 65.0 63.4 61.4 58.8 55.7 52.7 50.7 
         
Month-relative-to-birth 
1 month 
after birth 
2 months  
after birth 
3 months 
after birth 
4 months 
after birth 
5 months 
after birth 
6 months 
after birth 
7 months 
after birth 
8 months 
after birth 
Panel B: Months after Birth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DDD Estimates 0.112*** 0.079* 0.06 0.098** 0.038 0.038 0.000 0.02 
  (0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) 
Mean of Labor Force 
Participation (%) 
51.6 52.6 53.6 55.0 55.6 56.1 56.6 56.8 
Notes: These are the monthly DDD estimates in Figure 1.8.2 corresponding to 𝜃𝑡 in equation (2). Each column in Panel A indicates the estimated impact of 
the pregnancy exemption on women’s labor force participation for each month before birth. Each column in Panel B indicates the effects for each month 
after birth. Year and state fixed effects as well as state-level characteristics are controlled for. The end-of-survey SIPP sampling weights are used for each 
mother-birth level observation. Standard errors are clustered by mother-birth.                              
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.3: Joint Test of Significance for Impact of the Pregnancy 
Exemption on Women’s Labor Force Participation 
 
During Pregnancy Around Birth After Birth 
 
-9 to -3 -2 to 2 3 to 12 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Average DDD 0.022 0.103* 0.049 
p-value of Joint Test 0.261  0.100  0.196  
        Notes: The table 1.3 summarizes the monthly DDD results in Figure 1.8.2 by the periods around birth.   
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.4: Triple-Difference Estimates of the AYC Exemption on Labor Force Participation Around Childbirth 
         
Month-relative-to-birth 
7 months 
before birth 
6 months 
before birth 
5 months 
before birth 
4 months 
before birth 
3 months 
before birth 
2 months  
before birth 
1 month 
before birth 
month of 
birth 
Panel A: Months Before Birth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DDD Estimates 0.085 0.022 -0.005 -0.015 -0.024 -0.065 -0.110** -0.085 
 
(0.061) (0.058) (0.058) 0.058  0.057  (0.062) (0.056) (0.056) 
Mean of Labor Force 
Participation (%) 
66.7 65.0 63.4 61.4 58.8 55.7 52.7 50.7 
         
Month-relative-to-birth 
1 month  
after birth 
2 months  
after birth 
3 months 
after birth 
4 months 
after birth 
5 months 
after birth 
6 months 
after birth 
7 months 
after birth 
8 months 
after birth 
Panel B: Months after Birth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DDD Estimates 0.003 0.051 0.069 0.124** 0.150** 0.081 0.125** 0.137** 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.057) (0.063) 0.063  (0.061) (0.060) 
Mean of Labor Force 
Participation (%) 
51.6 52.6 53.6 55.0 55.6 56.1 56.6 56.8 
Notes: These are the monthly DDD estimates in Figure 1.12.2 corresponding to 𝜃𝑡 in equation (2). Each column in Panel A indicates the estimated impact of 
the AYC exemption on women’s labor force participation for each month before birth. Each column in Panel B indicates the effects for each month after 
birth. Year and state fixed effects as well as state-level characteristics are controlled for. The end-of-survey SIPP sampling weights are used for each mother-
birth level observation. Standard errors are clustered by mother-birth.                        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.5: Joint Test of Significance for Impact of the AYC Exemption 
on Women’s Labor Force Participation  
 
During Pregnancy Around Birth After Birth 
 
-9 to -3 -2 to 2 3 to 12 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Average DDD 0.015 -0.041*** 0.128*** 
p-value of Joint Test 0.430  0.000 0.001 
             Notes: The table 1.5 summarizes the monthly DDD results in Figure 1.12.2 by the periods around birth.  
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1.1 Labor Force Participation of Women with Children under 18: 1975−2005 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, unpublished tabulations from the Current 
Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 1976−2006. 
Notes: This figure is an excerpt from the Annual Report to Congress 2005, chapter 3. Predictors and Risk 
Factors Associated with Welfare Receipt (http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/indicators05/ch3.htm)  
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Figure 1.2 Cross-State and Within-State Variation in Pregnancy Exemption 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pregnancy 
exemption   
1996-2003 
Always lenient         
(Pregnancy exemption 
exists) 
Always strict                          
(No pregnancy 
exemption exists) 
Lenient to strict 
(Eliminated  
pregnancy 
exemption) 
Number of 
States 
15 7 29 
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Figure 1.3 Cross-State and Within-State Variation in AYC Exemption 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
AYC 
Exemption 
1996-2003 
Always lenient  
(≥ 12 months) 
Always strict  
(< 12months) 
Lenient to 
strict 
Number of 
States 
26 3 22 
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Figure 1.4 Budget Constraints Prior to Work Requirements: Pre- and Post-Birth 
 
Figure 1.4.1 Childcare costs: Variable cost (c) Only 
 
Figure 1.4.2 Childcare costs: Variable cost (c) and Fixed cost (F) 
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Figure 1.5 Single Mothers’ Labor Supply Responses to the Introduction of Work Requirements 
Figure 1.5.1 Pre-Birth, no work before work requirements        Figure 1.5.2 Pre-Birth, work before work requirements 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5.3 Post-Birth, no work before work requirements, VC only   Figure 1.5.4 Post-Birth, no work before work requirements, FC+VC  
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Figure 1.6 Descriptive Patterns in Women’s Labor Force Participation
 
Note:  In Figure 1.6 Panels A, B, and C, I plot coefficients on month-relative-to-birth dummies added back 
to the average level of labor force participation one year prior to birth – these are the 𝛿𝑡 coefficients added 
back to the level of labor force participation in the omitted period (j= ─12) from estimating equation (3) as 
described in section 1.5.4. The end-of-survey SIPP sampling weights are used for each mother-birth level 
observation. Standard errors are clustered by mother-birth. Panel A is produced by replicating Byker (2014). 
In Panel B and C, single mothers are unmarried, divorced, widowed, or separated women for all months 
before and after childbirth and reside with no senior members or partners in the household. Married mothers 
are married for all months before and after childbirth. 
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C. Labor Force Participation for Women who gave Birth in the 1996 and 2001 
SIPP Panel by Marital Status and by Birth Order 
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Figure 1.7 Labor Force Participation by the Strictness of Pregnancy Exemption 
 
 
Note: Panels A and B in Figure 1.7 show the changes in labor force participation relative to 9 
months prior to birth. With month ─9 omitted, the level of labor force participation is normalized 
to zero at ─9. Year and state fixed effects as well as state-level characteristics are controlled for in 
all specifications. The end-of-survey SIPP sampling weights are used. Standard errors are 
clustered by mother-birth. 
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Figure 1.8 Impact of the Pregnancy Exemption on Labor Force Participation 
 
Figure 1.8.1 Difference-in-Differences Event Study Estimates by Marital Status 
 
 
 
Note: Panels A and B in Figure 1.8.1 show the changes in labor force participation relative to 9 
months prior to birth separately by the strictness of the pregnancy exemption. With month ─9 
omitted, the level of labor force participation is normalized to zero at ─9. These are the 𝜋𝑡 
coefficients from estimating equation (1) with the dependent variable being an indicator for 
participation in the labor force. The regression includes year and state fixed effects as well as 
state-level characteristics as described in section 1.4.1. The end-of-survey SIPP sampling weights 
are used. Standard errors are clustered by mother-birth. The dotted line at the bottom plots the 
monthly differences in labor force participation between strict and lenient states. This provides the 
DD estimates of the impact of no pregnancy exemption on labor force participation. 
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Figure 1.8.2 Triple-Difference Event Study Estimates for Labor Force Participation 
 
Note: Figure 1.8.2 plots the DDD estimates, 𝜃𝑡 from estimating equation (2), which are the 
coefficients on the interaction between month-relative-to-birth, an indicator for strict pregnancy 
policy, and an indicator for single mothers. The dependent variable is an indicator for participation 
in the labor force. The regression includes year and state fixed effects as well as state-level 
characteristics as described in section 1.4.2. The end-of-survey SIPP sampling weights are used. 
Standard errors are clustered by mother-birth. Table 1.2 provides a summary of these results with 
the point estimates and significance levels for each month during the 7 months before and 8 
months after birth. 
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Figure 1.9 Impact of the Pregnancy Exemption on Mothers’ Employment  
 
Figure 1.9.1 Difference-in-Differences Event Study Estimates for Single Mothers 
 
 
Figure 1.9.2 Triple Difference Event Study Estimates for Employment 
 
 
 
Joint test of significance 
: -2 to +2 with p-value of 0.01
  
  -3 to +3 with p-value of 0.04 
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Figure 1.10 Impact of the Pregnancy Exemption on TANF receipt  
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Figure 1.11 Labor Force Participation by the Strictness of AYC Exemption Policy 
 
 
Note: Panels A and B in Figure 1.11 show the changes in labor force participation relative to 9 
months prior to birth. With month ─9 omitted, the level of labor force participation is normalized 
to zero at ─9. Year and state fixed effects as well as state-level characteristics are controlled for in 
all specifications. The end-of-survey SIPP sampling weights are used. Standard errors are 
clustered by mother-birth. 
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Figure 1.12 Impact of the AYC Exemption on Mothers’ Labor Force Participation  
 
Figure 1.12.1 Difference-in-Differences Event Study Estimates by Marital Status 
 
 
 
 
Note: Panels A and B in Figure 1.12.1 show the changes in labor force participation relative to 9 
months prior to birth, separately by the strictness of the AYC exemption. With month ─9 omitted, 
the level of labor force participation is normalized to zero at ─9. These are the 𝜋𝑡 coefficients from 
estimating equation (1) with the dependent variable being an indicator for participation in the labor 
force. The regression includes year and state fixed effects as well as state-level characteristics as 
described in section 1.4.1. The end-of-survey SIPP sampling weights are used. Standard errors are 
clustered by mother-birth. The dotted line at the bottom plots the monthly differences in labor 
force participation between strict and lenient states. This provides the DD estimates of the impact 
of a strict AYC exemption on labor force participation. 
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Figure 1.12.2 Triple Difference Event Study Estimates for Labor Force 
Participation 
 
 
Note: Figure 1.12.2 plots the DDD estimates, 𝜃𝑡 from estimating equation (2), which are 
coefficients on the interaction between the month-relative-to-birth, an indicator for AYC strict 
policy, and an indicator for single mothers. The dependent variable is an indicator for participation 
in the labor force. The regression includes year and state fixed effects as well as state-level 
characteristics as described in section 1.4.2. The end-of-survey SIPP sampling weights are used. 
Standard errors are clustered by mother-birth. Table 1.4 provides a summary of these results with 
the point estimates and significance levels for each month during the 7 months before and 8 
months after birth. 
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Figure 1.13 Impact of the AYC Exemption on Mothers’ Employment  
 
Figure 1.13.1 Difference-in-Differences Event Study Estimates for Single Mothers 
 
 
Figure 1.13.2 Triple Difference Event Study Estimates for Employment 
 
 
Joint test of significance 
: -2 to +0 with p-value of 0.03 
  -4 to +2 with p-value of 0.09 
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Figure 1.14 Impact of the AYC Exemption on Mothers’ Unemployment  
 
Figure 1.14.1 Difference-in-Differences Event Study Estimates for Single Mothers 
 
 
Figure 1.14.2 Triple Difference Event Study Estimates for Unemployment 
 
 
Joint test of significance 
: -2 to +1 with p-value of 0.08 
  -2 to 0 with p-value of 0.06 
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Figure 1.15 Impact of the AYC Exemption on TANF receipt  
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Figure A1.1 TANF Participation Before and After Childbirth 
 
 
Note: In Figure A1.1 Panels A, B, and C, I plot coefficients on month-relative-to-birth dummies 
added back to the average level of TANF participation one year prior to birth – these are the 𝛿𝑡 
coefficients added back to the level of TANF participation in the omitted period (j= −12) from 
estimating equation (3) as described in section 1.5.4. The end-of-survey SIPP sampling weights 
are used for each mother-birth level observation. Standard errors are clustered by mother-birth. In 
Panels B and C, single mothers are unmarried, divorced, widowed, or separated women for all 
months before and after childbirth and reside with no senior members or partners in the household. 
Married mothers are married for all months before and after childbirth. 
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Figure A1.2 Impact of the AYC Exemption on General Fertility Rates  
 
Note: Figure A1.2 plots the DDD estimates, which are coefficients on the interaction between the 
year-relative-to-AYC exemption policy change, and an indicator for single mothers with the 
dependent variable being GFR as described in section 1.8.1. The regression includes year and state 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state. The dashed lines indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
 
Figure A1.3 Impact of the Pregnancy Exemption on General Fertility Rates  
 
Note: Figure A1.3 plots the DDD estimates, which are coefficients on the interaction between the 
year-relative-to-pregnancy exemption policy change, and an indicator for single mothers with the 
dependent variable being GFR as described in section 1.8.1. The regression includes year and state 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state. The dashed lines indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Figure A1.4 Impact of the Pregnancy Exemption on Infants’ Birth Weight  
 
Note: Figure A1.4 plots the DDD estimates, which are coefficients on the interaction between the 
year-relative-to-pregnancy exemption policy change, and an indicator for single mothers with the 
dependent variable being infants’ birth weight (in grams) as described in section 1.8.2. The 
regression includes year and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state. The dashed 
lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure A1.5 Proportion of the Analysis Sample by the Timing of Policy Change in 
the Two Exemptions 
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Figure A1.6 Triple Difference Event Study Estimates for Labor Force Participation 
 
Figure A1.6.1 By Lifetime Limit 
 
Note: Figure A1.6.1 plots the DDD estimates, 𝜃𝑡 from estimating equation (2), which are 
coefficients on the interaction between the month-relative-to-birth, an indicator for TANF lifetime 
limit shorter than 60 months, and an indicator for single mothers. The regression includes year and 
state fixed effects as well as state-level characteristics as described in section 1.4.2. The end-of-
survey SIPP sampling weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by mother-birth.  
 
Figure A1.6.2 By Weekly Minimum Hours Required for Work 
  
Note: Figure A1.6.2 plots the DDD estimates, 𝜃𝑡 from estimating equation (2), which are 
coefficients on the interaction between the month-relative-to-birth, an indicator for minimum hour 
requirement at least 30 hours per week, and an indicator for single mothers. The regression 
includes year and state fixed effects as well as state-level characteristics as described in section 
1.4.2. The end-of-survey SIPP sampling weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by 
mother-birth.  
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Figure A1.6.3 By the Existence of Family Cap Policy 
 
Note: Figure A1.6.3 plots the DDD estimates, 𝜃𝑡 from estimating equation (2), which are 
coefficients on the interaction between the month-relative-to-birth, an indicator for family cap on 
benefit increase, and an indicator for single mothers. The regression includes year and state fixed 
effects as well as state-level characteristics as described in section 1.4.2. The end-of-survey SIPP 
sampling weights are used. Standard errors are clustered by mother-birth.  
 
Figure A1.6.4 By the Existence of Full Sanction 
 
Note: Figure A1.6.4 plots the DDD estimates, 𝜃𝑡 from estimating equation (2), which are 
coefficients on the interaction between the month-relative-to-birth, an indicator for full sanction 
(termination of benefit for non-compliance of work requirements), and an indicator for single 
mothers. The regression includes year and state fixed effects as well as state-level characteristics 
as described in section 1.4.2. The end-of-survey SIPP sampling weights are used. Standard errors 
are clustered by mother-birth.  
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Chapter 2  
Changes in Low-income Households’ 
Spending Patterns in Response to the 
2009 SNAP Benefits Increase 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
One out of seven U.S. residents is participating in the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as the Food Stamp Program. SNAP is the 
federal government’s largest nutrition assistance program, providing average monthly 
benefit of $133 per person, which can only be used to purchase food at participating 
retailers. The program initiated in the 1960s and participation rate has been dramatically 
increasing since then. Unlike most means-tested welfare programs with restricted 
eligibility to particular categories of low-income individuals, SNAP is broadly available 
to almost all households with low incomes. Furthermore, SNAP eligibility rules and 
benefit levels are almost uniform across the nation, providing little cross-state variation. 
Therefore, it has been challenging to identify a causal effect due to selection into program 
and unobservable differences in participants and non-participants.  
Consequently, one way to evaluate the program is to focus on policy changes 
made at the federal level and observe how the changes have affected SNAP participants 
differently. There were two notable SNAP policy changes in recent years: In direct 
response to the Great Recession, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
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 of 2009 increased SNAP maximum monthly benefits by 13.6 percent beginning on April 1, 
2009 as a way of stimulating the economy and easing hardship. ARRA provided that SNAP 
benefit levels would continue until the program’s regular annual inflation adjustments to the 
maximum SNAP allotment exceeded those set by ARRA. However, food price inflation 
turned out to be lower than expected, accelerating the sunset date of the ARRA benefit 
increase to October 31, 2013. As a result, SNAP benefit levels were cut beginning on 
November 1, 2013.  
In this study, I quantify the effects of an unprecedentedly large rise in SNAP benefits 
in 2009 on low-income households’ consumption. In the recent literature, consumption has 
been favored over income as a measure of the well-being for those at the bottom of the 
income distribution, as it reflects permanent income and the insurance value of government 
programs as well as private and government transfers (Meyer and Sullivan, 2008). 
Consumption also likely better captures income from informal jobs. Therefore, this paper 
addresses to what extent the increase in SNAP benefits provided low-income households with 
a cushion from a negative shock in household expenditures that they might otherwise have 
faced resulting from the onset of the Great Recession.  
By employing a simple difference-in-differences strategy, I compare consumption of 
SNAP households with that of low-income non-participants before and after the increase in 
SNAP benefits. I use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data from 2007 to 2011, 
which covers 2 years before to 2 years after the 2009 SNAP benefit increase. 
I find that total household expenditures rose more by $393−422 per quarter for 
SNAP households compared to that of low-income non-participants after the 2009 ARRA. 
When I assess each expenditure category separately, the increase is pronounced in the 
subcategories of food (strongly driven by food at home) and housing (mainly by shelter costs 
and utility). This provides suggestive evidence that the SNAP benefit increase in 2009 not 
only helped participating households to expand food expenditures, but also to allocate 
expanded resources to meet households’ other needs.  
This paper has two important contributions. A number of papers about SNAP have 
used either cash-out experiments or the introduction of the Food Stamp Program in the 1960s 
to estimate the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) on food out of food stamp benefits 
compared to equivalent cash. However, given that the size and characteristics of population 
served by SNAP have been changed dramatically over the past years, papers using data from 
decades ago shed little light on the behavior of contemporary SNAP participants and current 
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policy issues. Recently, there has been a continuous debate on whether to increase the SNAP 
benefits to improve the purchasing power of low-income households who are still facing 
substantial barriers to adequate food consumption. Therefore, first contribution of my paper is 
that I study the current program to highlight the effectiveness of the SNAP benefit increase in 
expanding the food budget of needy families.  
There is one study (Beatty and Tuttle 2015) that documented the 2009 SNAP benefit 
increase, but it focuses only on food spending of participant households to estimate MPC out 
of the SNAP benefit increase. The focus of this paper is not estimating the MPC, but 
identifying welfare effects of the SNAP benefit increase, which allows low-income 
households to also expand their non-food consumption. Thus, it is essential to examine the 
effects of an increase in in-kind transfers on non-targeted spending categories in order to fully 
assess the policy. Consequently, a second contribution is that I investigate all expenditure 
categories to identify any important resource allocation across categories in response to the 
increase in in-kind transfers. Theoretical framework suggests that the increase in SNAP 
benefits should increase food expenditures, but by less than the increased amount. This 
difference can be possibly reflected in other categories, providing further evidence of overall 
welfare improvement of recipients.  
The findings of this paper are robust to a host of specification tests. First, to alleviate 
the concern that the results may have simply picked up the differential trends across groups, I 
do the same analysis over two different placebo periods, the pre-ARRA period (2007−2008) 
and post-ARRA period (2010−2011), as a robustness check. I find no evidence of differential 
effects between the two groups in the years before ARRA and years after ARRA. Second, 
direct comparison between SNAP and non-SNAP recipients can be confounded by self-
selection and under-reporting of SNAP receipt. Accordingly, I use the income-to-poverty 
ratio as well as the education, employment, and marital status of a household’s head as a 
proxy for SNAP participation. The results remain substantially similar across different 
treatment definitions. 
 
2.2 Background and Institutional Detail 
In direct response to the Great Recession, Congress passed the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in February 2009. It is commonly referred to as “the Stimulus 
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Package” or “the Recovery Act”. At roughly $800 billion, it was one of the largest fiscal 
stimulus programs in American history (Wilson 2012).  
There has been substantial policy interest in evaluating the effects of the Recovery 
Act on overall economic activities, particularly of vulnerable groups. A wide range of 
provisions of the ARRA was targeted toward low-income households to offset a collapse in 
the economy by protecting jobs and reviving consumer spending, through tax credits and 
direct transfer payments. In theory, lower income households are expected to spend more of 
any stimulus money they receive and more quickly (Johnson et al. 2006), thus transfers to 
these households can push back against rising poverty and economic hardship. 
To be specific, unemployment benefits were extended to as long as 99 weeks and 
increased by $25 a week. Unemployment benefits were excluded from taxation for the first 
$2,400. In addition, there was a one-time direct cash payment of $250 to Social Security 
recipients, people on Supplemental Security Income, and veterans receiving disability and 
pensions. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was expanded for families with at least 
three children. Furthermore, billions of dollars were distributed to support welfare payments, 
such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Family (TANF), Special Supplemental Nutrition 
Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), free school lunch programs, job training 
and the employment service. In particular, the monthly maximum benefit of the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, commonly known as Food Stamp Program) was 
increased by about 13.6 percent. 
This increase was unprecedentedly large since the initiation of the program. Figure 
2.1 depicts the trend of maximum SNAP monthly benefits for a family of 4 in 1994 dollars. A 
remarkable peak coincides with the 2009 ARRA. Table 2.1 reports the average benefit 
amount for a family of 4 in each fiscal year, and the percent change in benefit level. The 13.6 
percent increase in benefit level in 2009 was the most significant boost compared to any other 
years. 
Table 2.2 presents the increased dollar amount of SNAP from 2009 ARRA by family 
size. It is extra $18 to $24 per person per month, supplementing low-income households’ 
food purchases and even allowing them to afford other spending. In this study, I find that the 
SNAP benefit increase certainly provided some firm ground to low-income households by 
moderating a negative shock after the Great Recession.  
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2.3 Theoretical Framework 
I present a neoclassical model of consumer choice and predict the effect of a SNAP 
benefit increase on a household’s spending. Figure 2.2 provides the overall conceptual 
framework. It is based on the standard Southworth (1945) model, where consumers allocate a 
fixed budget between food and all other goods.  
Panel A shows the impact of a SNAP benefit increase on the budget constraint. The 
budget line shifts out by the amount of the increased SNAP benefits (𝐵𝐹
"), from 𝐶𝐷̅̅ ̅̅  to 𝐸𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ . 
The slope stays the same as the relative price between food and non-food is not affected by 
the transfers.  
Panel B depicts two types of SNAP recipients―infra-marginal (A) and extra-
marginal (B).  
(A) Infra-marginal recipient: The infra-marginal type accounts for the vast majority 
of SNAP recipients (Hoynes et al., 2014). They spend more than SNAP amount on food, thus 
they use up all of the SNAP benefits and have positive out-of-pocket spending. In other 
words, their SNAP benefits are treated like cash (Whitmore 2002). After the SNAP benefit 
rises, infra-marginal recipients move from 𝐴1
∗  and choose the optimal consumption bundle 
denoted by 𝐴2
∗ . This simple static consumer choice theory predicts that their food expenditure 
goes up with the expanded budget, but the increase is less than the increased amount of 
SNAP benefit. Instead, their expenditure on non-food goods also goes up as a result of their 
reduced out-of-pocket spending on food.  
(B) Extra-marginal recipient: The extra-marginal type prefers relatively little food 
consumption. The SNAP allotment is large enough to result in zero dollars of out-of-pocket 
spending on food. Hence, their food expenditure is equal to the SNAP benefits. In other 
words, the SNAP benefit amount determines their food expenditures. When the SNAP benefit 
is increased, extra-marginal recipients move from point 𝐵1
∗  to point 𝐵2
∗ , increasing food 
expenditure by the exact amount of a SNAP benefit increase, while spending on non-food 
goods is unchanged.  
It is empirically well-known fact that most SNAP recipients are infra-marginal, thus 
this model derives two testable hypothesis: 1) ARRA would induce a majority of SNAP 
recipients to increase food as well as non-food expenditures; 2) the increase in food 
expenditures will not be equal to the full amount of the SNAP benefit increase, but to be less. 
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Figure 2.3 presents total food spending decomposed into cash spending and SNAP 
spending as a function of household net income for infra-marginal group. Maximum SNAP 
benefit is a horizontal line when family size is fixed. A family with zero income is eligible for 
the maximum SNAP allotment, which becomes their food expenditures. As income grows, 
the SNAP benefit decreases proportionally, with the benefit reduction rate currently set at 
0.3.
28
 I hypothesize that total food spending increases with income.
29
 For example, in Panel 
A, a household participating in SNAP spends total AC on food, among which AB is coming 
from SNAP and BC is coming out of own pocket. The ARRA raised the maximum benefits 
to be 113.6 percent of the original. Therefore, the maximum SNAP benefit line is shifted up 
by 13.6 percent in Panel B. Accordingly the SNAP benefit line is also shifted up with the 
slope unchanged. Total food spending rises for SNAP households (households whose income 
is less than 130% of the poverty line
30
), but does not change for non-SNAP households. After 
the ARRA, the hypothetical household’s total spending on food now reaches 𝐴𝐶′, increased 
by 𝐶𝐶′. This rise is less than the increased SNAP benefit, 𝐵𝐵′. In other words, infra-marginal 
recipients treat the increased amount of SNAP like an increase in cash transfer, leading to a 
rise in both food and non-food spending.  
The predictions of the model guide an empirical test of my research question: How 
much would food expenditures go up in response to the rise in SNAP benefits? Would the 
increase in SNAP benefits lead to increase in both food and non-food expenditures? The first 
question has been asked by many previous studies, but almost all of them compared pre- and 
post-Food Stamp program to estimate MPC on food. By studying the benefit change occurred 
in 2009, I provide empirical evidence on the response in food expenditures to the increase in 
SNAP allotments. The second question is fairly new research question as a number of papers 
about SNAP have been addressing shifts in food spending, but not in non-food spending, 
which forms another great portion of low-income households’ life. 
 
 
                                                        
28 The net monthly income of the household is multiplied by 0.3, and then subtracted from the maximum allotment for the 
household size to find the household’s allotment (i.e. SNAP=Maximum allotment−0.3∙ [net income]). This is because SNAP 
households are expected to spend about 30 percent of their resources on food (http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility). 
29 It is a well-known Engel’s law that the share of income spent on food declines with income level. Although the share 
declines, the absolute dollar amount spent on food for high-income households will be still greater than the total food 
expenditures of low-income households. 
30 In the model, I adopt a simple version and assume that every household whose income is less than 130% of the poverty 
line participates in SNAP, while those with income more than 130% of the poverty line does not. Empirically, SNAP 
eligibility is not strictly enforced by income threshold – those with high income may be eligible, and those with low income 
may not when other things are considered such as asset test, broad-based categorical eligibility, and stigma of usage, etc.  
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2.4 Literature Review 
A large body of literature has delved into estimating marginal propensity to 
consume (MPC) on food out of food stamps in comparison to MPC with cash transfer in 
order to evaluate the effectiveness of the program on expanding food budget of low-income 
people. Years during 1960s and 1970s, when the Food Stamp Program was first established, 
have been examined in order to identify these estimates.  
Salathe (1980), for example, used data from the 1972−74 Consumer Expenditure 
Diary survey and compared Food Stamp recipients with comparably poor non-recipients to 
estimate that Food Stamps increase at-home food expenditures by 36 cents for each Food 
Stamp benefit dollar received. In comparison, he reported that a cash transfer would expand 
at-home food purchases by only 6 cents. A recent study by Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2007) 
exploits variations in the timing of the implementation of the Food Stamp Program (1963 to 
1975) across counties. They show that the introduction of the Food Stamp Program led to an 
overall increase in household total food expenditures among recipients, but a decreased 
propensity to eat out, and mixed results for cash food expenditures (i.e. out-of-pocket food 
expenditures). 
Another strand of the literature addresses selection into the program by collecting 
data from a major cash-out randomized trial, where the Food Stamp benefits were paid out in 
cash instead of food stamps to a random subset of recipients. However, they have drawn 
inconsistent conclusions across experiments. Fraker (1990) summarizes that the MPC out of 
food stamps is two to ten times higher than that out of cash income. Yet, Moffitt (1989), with 
the experiment in Puerto Rico in 1982, finds no effect of converting food stamps into cash on 
the food expenditure decisions of recipients. From San Diego cash-out experiment, both 
Levedahl (1995) and Breunig and Dasgupta (2002, 2005) argue that the MPC out of food 
stamps is greater than cash, but with different expositions associated with a greater MPC.  
All in all, the vast majority of the literature suggests that the Food Stamp Program 
increases household food expenditures, with a slightly higher or similar MPC on food than 
that out of direct cash transfers. Yet, most of the studies use data from 20 years ago or earlier. 
The current SNAP has considerably evolved since its inception. Important changes include 
the elimination of the purchase requirement
31
, the switch to electronic benefit transfer (EBT), 
                                                        
31 Families were required to make a cash payment upfront to receive their food stamp benefits. For example, if the family 
was able to afford to spend $50 on food, but the cost of the thrifty food plan was $70, the family could purchase $70 in food 
stamps for the cash price of $20. Under the current SNAP program, they would receive $20 without outlaying any cash. 
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and the associated decline in black markets for food stamps. Moreover, the characteristics of 
SNAP participating households have been markedly changing over time. Participation has 
nearly quadrupled since the program’s introduction, increasing from 4 percent of the U.S. 
population in 1971 to nearly 15% in 2011 (Beatty and Turtle, 2015). Accordingly, we are 
greatly in need of studying the current program by estimating the effects that are directly 
relevant to policymakers: the effect of the increase in SNAP benefits. 
There are two studies that have looked at the impact of the SNAP benefit increase 
following 2009 ARRA. Using the Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement 
(CPS-FSS), Nord and Prell (2011) compare food spending in December 2009 with that for 
December 2008. To provide an estimate of changes in food expenditures and food security 
that are attributable to ARRA, they use a difference-in-differences approach to net out the 
effect of year-to-year changes in food prices and any other factors that affected the SNAP-
eligible and non-eligible groups similarly. Their results suggest that the increase in food 
expenditures of SNAP-eligible households is estimated to be greater by 2.2 percent than non-
eligible households. They also compared SNAP participant and non-participant group using 
the SNAP receipt information in CPS. In this direct comparison, they find a much larger 
impact: median food expenditures increased by 9.1 percent among SNAP-participant 
households compared with 3.4 percent among SNAP-eligible non-participating households. 
This may have overstated the impact, which is attributed to an upward bias, as selection into 
SNAP is positively correlated with tastes for food consumption (Moffitt 1983; Currie 2004). 
Most recently, Beatty and Tuttle (2015), using CEX data, examined several recent 
SNAP benefit increases over the period of 2007 to 2010 (including the largest increase from 
2009 ARRA) and found that they caused households to increase food-at-home expenditure as 
well as the share allocated to food-at-home. They employ the same methodology, a 
difference-in-differences, but use the Coarsened Exact Matching approach (CEM) to create a 
comparison group. A comparison group is generated with a distribution of explanatory 
variables similar to the treatment group, which improves balance between the two groups, 
and thereby groups differ only by SNAP participation. Yet, there are several drawbacks with 
Beatty and Tuttle (2015), which distinguish theirs from my paper: First, they do not solely 
focus on the SNAP benefit increase from 2009 ARRA, but their analysis spans from 2007 to 
2010 and include relatively smaller increases such as 4.6% benefit increase in 2007 and 8.5% 
increase in 2008. My paper centers around 14% benefit increase in 2009 ARRA to capture 
the impact of the largest increase in SNAP during the times of recession. Second, Beatty and 
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Tuttle (2015) focus on food expenditures, disregarding all of the other categories available in 
the CEX. I make a further contribution by investigating all spending categories to identify 
any possible allocation across categories after the benefit increase. Lastly, SNAP 
participation information, except for the first and last interviews, are imputed in the CEX. 
Beatty and Tuttle use the households that have completed two interviews in a row, one 
immediately before and the other immediately after the increase. This sample is prone to 
SNAP imputation issue, and is restricted to families who interviewed at least two consecutive 
quarters. I improve on this by using only the first quarterly interview where income and 
program participation are actually reported. Furthermore, I use one interview per consumer 
unit regardless of the number of quarterly interviews they have completed
32
.  
Although I do not estimate MPC on food with the SNAP benefit increase in this 
paper, the findings align with the two previous studies. Results confirm that most SNAP 
recipients are infra-marginal by showing that the increase in food expenditures is less than the 
increased amount of SNAP benefits. Furthermore, I show that the increase in transfers 
induces them to expand not only food spending but also other categories of spending during a 
time of economic crisis. 
  
2.5 Data and the Empirical Identification Strategy 
2.5.1 Data 
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), administered by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, is the only survey in the U.S. that collects a complete record of consumption 
expenditure data on hundreds of categories of goods and services. In addition to the buying 
habits of the nation’s households, the CEX also reports household characteristics, income, 
and program participation.  
The CEX consists of two surveys, the quarterly interview survey and the diary 
survey. In the interview survey, each consumer unit
33
 is interviewed every three months, 
providing a short panel of up to five consecutive quarters. In the diary survey, respondents 
keep track of all of their purchases for two consecutive weeks. In this paper, I use the 
                                                        
32 I found that economically advantaged households are more likely to complete all five quarterly interviews. Therefore, 
looking at the first interview only would alleviate this confounding relationship between number of interviews completed 
and households’ SES. 
33 Consumer unit are either members of a household, a person living alone or with others, or two or more persons living 
together who make joint expenditure decisions. I use consumer unit and household interchangeably to describe the unit of 
analysis. 
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interview survey, which is designed to obtain data on the types of expenditures respondents 
can recall for a period of three months or longer. Relatively large and regular expenditures, 
such as rent, utilities, health care, major durable goods, as well as food, are reported in the 
interview survey. 
The analysis sample is drawn from the CEX for 2007 to 2011, two years before and 
two years after the 2009 ARRA SNAP benefit increase, to compare pre- and post-ARRA 
consumption. I focus on low-income households whose income is below 250% of the poverty 
line. 
In the analysis, I restrict the sample to households with heads at least 20 years old 
but less than 65 years old to avoid any distinct consumption patterns for households headed 
by the young or the old. I exclude households whose quarterly expenditures exceed $60,000, 
which accounts for about 2.4 percent of the entire data. These are outliers that influence the 
estimators in an unwanted direction. Although each consumer unit is interviewed once per 
quarter for up to five consecutive quarters, I only use the first interview for each consumer 
unit. In other words, a household contributes once to the sample no matter how many 
interviews they have completed. This is again because of income and program participation 
information in the CEX: expenditure information pertaining to the quarter or to individual 
months is collected in each quarterly interview, but information about income and program 
participation for the previous 12 months is collected in only two of the five interviews―the 
first interview and the last interview
34
. Therefore, income and program participation 
information in the analysis sample is relatively accurate since none of it is imputed. Finally, 
the sample size is 11,814 households―5,536 households before 2009 ARRA and 6,278 
households after the ARRA. 
It is worth noting that the dollar amount of SNAP benefits as well as SNAP receipt 
could be measured with substantial error in CEX. The number of households reporting SNAP 
receipt in the CEX is about 60 percent of the SNAP administrative records over the sample 
period (Hoynes et al. 2014). In that sense, estimates from this study may underestimate the 
actual impact of the SNAP benefit increase and may be thought of as a lower bound to the 
extent that those who refuse to report income and program participation are more likely to be 
from lower end of the income distribution (Keeter et al. 2000 found that surveys with higher 
response rates underrepresent low-income respondents than those with lower response rates).  
                                                        
34 Income and program participation data in the middle quarters are imputed, unless there is anyone turning 14 years old or 
any members who previously did not work but are now working. 
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2.5.2 Empirical Approach 
I employ a difference-in-differences (DID) estimator to examine the effects of the 
SNAP benefit increase on household consumption: 
 
(1)          𝐶𝑖.𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝑋𝑖.𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖.𝑡 
 
where 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 denotes dollar amounts of consumption for household, i, in quarter, t; SNAP is an 
indicator for SNAP participating households. I carefully design before and after groups: 
households who have completed their first interview any time before February 2009—the 
month of ARRA implementation—are included in before group and After takes on a value of 
zero. Those who have done their first interview any time after August 2009 are included in 
after group, and After takes on a value of one. After group reports its consumption from May 
2009, right after the ARRA SNAP increase. Any particular characteristics of the SNAP 
households potentially could affect consumption differently, regardless of the policy. 
Therefore, I control for a vector of demographic characteristics, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 , such as age of the 
reference person, age-squared, race, education, marital status, employment status of head, 
family size, number of children less than 18 years old, proportion of children under 5 years 
old, proportion of children over 5 years old, proportion of elderly over 65 years old, whether 
residing in metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and region of residence. Lastly, I also include 
month (January to December) and year (2007 to 2010) fixed effects to control for seasonality 
and yearly changes that affect all households. This is a standard difference-in-differences 
model with β3  measuring the difference between the change in the SNAP group’s 
consumption pre- to post- ARRA and the change in the non-SNAP group’s consumption pre- 
to post-ARRA. Any changes in consumption common to both groups will be netted out. 
Yet, direct comparison between SNAP recipients and non-recipients can be 
confounded by self-selection and under-reporting of SNAP receipt. Especially, we need to 
cautious about the selection into SNAP at the time of the ARRA enactment. The increase in 
SNAP benefits may have changed the self-selection probabilities—some households would 
not have been motivated to participate with the pre-ARRA benefit level, but now would be 
induced to participate by a larger benefit. These households are likely to be at the margin of 
eligibility, better off than the average pre-ARRA participants and worse off than the average 
pre-ARRA non-participants (Nord and Prell, 2011). Accordingly, their inclusion into SNAP 
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participants could improve average household consumption status among participants, even 
in the absence of actual improvement due to the SNAP benefit increase. Thus, I alternatively 
use income-to-poverty ratio as a proxy for SNAP participation, as done by Nord and Prell 
(2011).  
Therefore, SNAP is 1 for 1) households received any SNAP for the past 12 months (0 
for households with no SNAP receipt with income below 250% of the poverty line); or 2) 
households whose income is below 130% of the poverty line (0 for households whose income 
is above 130% but below 250% of the poverty line
35
) 
  
2.6 Findings 
2.6.1 SNAP participants  vs  Non-participants 
Main results with difference-in-differences estimators are presented in Table 2.3. 
First, in Panel A, I use information on whether a household participated in SNAP for the past 
12 months to define treatment group.  
In each specification, three coefficients are shown. The coefficient on the SNAP 
variable indicates the difference in consumption between the two groups before ARRA. As 
expected, SNAP group has far lower expenditures, showing that they are worse off at 
baseline. The coefficient on the After variable estimates the pre- to post- change for the non-
SNAP group. The estimate of primary interest is the coefficient on the interaction term. This 
is the difference in the pre- to post-ARRA consumption change between the two groups.  
The detailed information provided by the CEX allows me to decompose the 
aggregate household spending into major expenditure categories.
36
 Table 2.3 shows the 
overall change in consumption (column (1)) as well as the contribution to the overall change 
from various components of consumption (column (2) to (11)). It is important to note that 
Food at home (column (3)) and Food away (column (4)) are subcategories of Food (column 
(2)); Shelter (column (6)) and Utility (column (7)) are subcategories of Housing (column (5)). 
All the other columns are independent categories. 
                                                        
35 The control group is above the eligibility range for SNAP but far below the national median income. 
36 Appendix 2A describes what is included in each spending category. 
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Among all households whose income
37
 is less than 250% of the poverty line, SNAP 
households are from the lower end of the consumption distribution—on average, total 
expenditures are lower than non-participants by $1,400 per quarter in the pre-ARRA period.  
 Interestingly, the coefficient on the food expenditures interaction term is statistically 
significant at $121.48, mainly driven by food at home expenditures. This makes sense 
because the SNAP benefits can only be used for designated food items, and so is mostly used 
for food at home.
38
 The magnitude on the interaction term is $119.42 for food at home. Since 
it is quarterly expenditure, it is equivalent to $40 of monthly expenditure. The mean 
household size in the SNAP sample is approximately 3 (Table A2.1), so by a back-of-the-
envelope calculation, this corresponds to about $13 per person per month. Table 2.2 shows 
that the average increase in monthly SNAP benefits per person is $18─$24, depending on 
family size. Thus, food expenditure goes up by less than the full SNAP benefit increase, 
which is consistent with the earlier discussion of the theoretical framework. This confirms 
that most SNAP recipients are infra-marginal, who treat an increase in SNAP benefits as an 
increase in disposable income. Thus, it can be analyzed as a pure income effect, and predicts 
an increase in both food spending and non-food spending.  
This finding aligns with a large body of previous research. Salathe (1980), and 
Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2007) find that SNAP benefits increase food purchases but by 
less than the full amount of the benefits. Andrews et al. (2007) argue that estimates of the 
extra food purchased as a result of a $1 increase in SNAP benefits range from 17 to 47 
cents. Since benefits can be used to purchase food only, a typical participating household is 
expected to cut back on out-of-pocket spending on food as a result of the benefit increase so 
as to meet other pressing non-food needs, such as housing or transportation that compete for 
a household’s bounded budget.  
This is precisely what we see from Table 2.3 Panel A. Expenditure on housing 
(shelter cost and utility) goes up significantly after the 2009 ARRA compared to non-SNAP 
participants. This reveals that the majority of recipients is infra-marginal and supports the 
hypothesis that they shift some cash to meet other needs such as housing fee or utility fee 
payment.  
                                                        
37 The income used for SNAP eligibility is a cash, pre-tax measure and does not include in-kind benefits or tax credits. 
Consequently, I use the before-tax income minus SNAP benefits to determine the treatment and control groups. 
38 The CEX “food at home” concept is the closest match to the items that can be purchased with SNAP benefits. This 
measure collects spending on food at groceries, convenience stores, farmers markets and home delivery services, minus the 
cost of paper products, cleaning supplies, pet food, and alcohol (Hoynes 2014). 
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Another note is that almost all coefficients on the After variable are negative, 
although imprecise. This suggests that there were sizable drops in almost every spending 
category for all low-income households, yet the drop was much attenuated for SNAP 
households’ food and housing expenditures compared to those of non-participants. 
Lastly, given that SNAP receipts in the CEX are fairly underreported, the results 
using SNAP receipt should be interpreted with caution. To the extent that there are 
households who rejected to report SNAP participation therefore included in non-SNAP 
group, the estimates here are underestimated and could be thought as a lower bound of the 
effect of the SNAP benefit increase.  
 
2.6.2 Households with income ≤ 130%  vs  Households with 130% 
<income ≤ 250% 
In this section, I define treatment group using the income eligibility criteria of SNAP. 
SNAP is one of the most universal safety net programs in the U.S. Since there is no targeting 
to particular groups beyond income and asset eligibility criteria
39
, SNAP is broadly available 
to almost all households with low incomes. Specifically, a household is eligible if its gross 
monthly income
40
 is less than 130% of the poverty line.  
In Table 2.3 Panel B, I use this income cutoff to identify SNAP group, with a 
comparison group whose income is greater than the cutoff, but lower than 250% of the 
poverty line
41
. However, we should note that income reported in the CEX does not have the 
same accounting period as the one that is used for SNAP eligibility: amount of income in past 
12 months is reported in the CEX, while gross monthly income is used for eligibility. Hence, 
the analysis sample consists more of longer-term poor households rather than households 
whose income was consistently high over the course of year, but a sudden negative shock 
introduced a plunge in income, pulling it below the SNAP eligibility line. 
Interaction terms are statistically significant and positive for almost all quarterly 
expenditure categories except food away, personal care and tobacco. The low-income group’s 
total expenditure rose after ARRA by $422 per quarter, slightly higher than the results in 
                                                        
39 Households have to meet both a monthly gross income test and a monthly net income test to be eligible for SNAP benefits 
unless all members are receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 
Other households with one or more elderly members only have to meet the net income test. 
40 Gross income means a household's total income before any deductions have been made. 
41 The crosstab of two different definitions demonstrates that a third of households with income less than 130% report SNAP 
receipt. 80% of households with SNAP receipt report income less than 130% of the poverty line.  
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Panel A. This increase in the total expenditures seems to be strongly driven by the food, 
housing, transportation, and entertainment categories. The magnitude on the interaction term 
of food expenditure is quite small here, $83.5, which indicates that the impact of policy 
change on SNAP recipients may be diluted by the inclusion of non-SNAP low-income 
households that were not affected by the ARRA SNAP increase. Consequently, Table 2.3 
Panel B shows the global effect of the ARRA on low-income households overall. 
Again, we can observe some negative coefficients on After variable, though not 
statistically significant. It indicates that the ARRA provisions targeted for low-income 
households protected them from negative consumption shocks as the increase in their 
expenditures on food, housing, and transportation offsets the drop in these categories. 
The increase in the housing and transportation expenditures for low-income 
households aligns with findings from Meyer and Sullivan (2008). Using the CEX, they 
describe the underlying trends in income and consumption for single mother headed families 
between 1993 and 2003, when dramatic changes in welfare and tax policies targeted poor 
families, including expansions in the EITC, welfare waivers, and the passage of the welfare 
reform. They analyze various components of consumption and find that spending on housing 
and transportation accounts for much of the increase in consumption in the bottom quintiles 
of income distribution. They report that the increase in housing consumption is mainly driven 
by increases in out-of-pocket rent and the increase in transportation is associated with trend 
toward increased work for single mothers during this time.  
 
2.6.3 Robustness Check 
1) The Placebo Period 
To alleviate concerns that what is picked up might be the differential trends across 
groups, I estimate the same specification over two placebo periods—the pre-ARRA period 
(2007−2008) and post-ARRA period (2010−2011). Table 2.4 shows placebo test results using 
years before ARRA. In Panel A, interaction term on food expenditures is not significant 
anymore, although there seems to be a large increase in spending on housing for SNAP group 
between 2007 and 2008. In Panel B, the interaction terms are statistically insignificant or 
even negative except food expenditures: low-income households’ quarterly food expenditures 
rose by $80 between 2007 and 2008. This is plausible given that there was a small increase in 
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SNAP allotment by 4.6% in October 2007, followed by an 8.5% increase in October 2008, as 
reported in Table 2.1. But we see smaller and insignificant impact on food at home. 
Table 2.5 presents placebo test results using years after ARRA. In these analyses, I 
find absolutely no effect and none of the coefficients on the interaction term is statistically 
significant, regardless of the choice of treatment group. The placebo period results suggest 
that economic trends over this period are not what the results are capturing. The difference-
in-differences estimates are only statistically and economically significant when two years 
pre-ARRA are compared with two years post-ARRA. The absence of significant results in the 
placebo periods suggest that the vulnerable households clearly responded to the SNAP 
benefit increase, which occurred in 2009 by expanding their household’s overall budget. 
 
2) Treatment Group Compositional Change Pre- and Post-ARRA 
The main issue with the current model specification is a possible compositional shift 
between treatment and control group over time. For example, suppose that I define the 
treatment group as households whose income falls under the 130% of the poverty line and the 
comparison group as households whose income falls under the 250% line, but above the 
130% line. The identifying assumption is that the difference between the two groups is fixed 
over time, and there is no shift across groups. However, a household whose income was 
above 130% of the poverty line before ARRA could have been in extreme economic hardship 
and fall below 130% after ARRA. Then, the inclusion of pre-ARRA control group into the 
post-ARRA treatment group may improve the estimated consumption of the latter group due 
to their life cycle consumption trend, contaminating the estimator. Similarly, SNAP 
participants before ARRA could be different from SNAP participants after ARRA in a 
number of ways. 
Ideally, we want to see only one single difference within treatment group across 
time: SNAP benefit increase. All the other characteristics should stay the same to identify the 
effect of the 2009 ARRA. To assure that the composition of treatment group is fixed over the 
period, I report summary statistics of the households included in treatment group to test 
whether any of their characteristics have changed significantly before and after ARRA. In 
Table A2.1, I present summary statistics of the households who report SNAP receipt in the 
past 12 months. There seems to be a slight upward trend in head’s education over time, but 
no notable difference in any other characteristics is observed before and after the ARRA. It is 
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interesting to discover that these households receive remarkably more unemployment 
benefits, SNAP benefits and Medicaid after 2009. 
In Table A2.2, households with income less than 130% of the poverty line look 
surprisingly balanced before and after, except age of head, number of earners, and race of 
head. Again, low-income households receive significantly more unemployment benefits, 
SNAP benefits, and Medicaid after 2009 ARRA, which reflects the impact of overall 
provisions of the ARRA on low-income households. 
This analysis yields convincing evidence that there is no compositional shift within 
the treatment group over the study time horizon. Otherwise, it could seriously confound the 
estimator by reflecting changing attributes of the group over time, failing to capture the effect 
of the SNAP benefit increase.  
 
3) Treatment Group defined by Education, Employment, and Marital Status of 
Head 
Given that SNAP receipt information in the CEX is incomplete and severely under-
reported compared to administrative data, I use demographic characteristics of household 
head to identify treatment group and control group. Disadvantageous social economic status 
such as low education, single or unemployed head is known to predict SNAP participation 
(USDA 2009). Substantially similar results across different definitions of treatment groups 
assure that there was indeed a positive effect of the ARRA SNAP increase on a wide range of 
disadvantaged populations. Table 2.6 Panel A reports the results when the treatment group is 
households with low-educated head. While there is no measurable impact on total 
expenditures, we still see positive and significant increase in food expenditures, although it 
seems to be mainly driven by food away. Panel B reports the results when the treatment 
group is households with single head. Here, we can find a very similar result as we saw in 
Table 2.3 Panel A: increase in the total expenditures, strongly driven by food and 
transportation spending. Lastly, in Panel C, I use employment status of household head and 
reveal that there are sizable increases in the total expenditures, mainly driven by food at home 
and housing expenditures. 
Results that are consistent across a host of different definitions of treatment group 
highlight that the 2009 ARRA provided a basic floor for protecting disadvantaged families 
and expanded their limited budget set to insure a basic level of consumption. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
The ARRA was one of the largest fiscal stimulus programs in U.S. history, with total 
spending accounting for approximately 2.6 percent of GDP over the years of 2009−2010. 
Given that consumption is generally favored over income as a measure of the well-being of 
the poor (Meyer and Sullivan, 2008), understanding consumption response to the increase in 
welfare transfers helps capture the well-being effect of the policy change. 
In this study, I focus on a plausibly exogenous and the largest one-time increase in 
SNAP benefits that started on April 1, 2009. Comparing SNAP households with non-
participants, I find sizable increases in food and housing expenditures in response to the 
SNAP benefit increase. Consistent with the theoretical framework, the increased amount in 
food expenditure is less than the full amount of the SNAP benefit increase. Instead, SNAP 
households redirected their expanded resources to other non-food spending such as housing, 
transportation, and entertainment. Consequently, the rise in SNAP benefits not only resulted 
in greater food expenditures, but also allowed SNAP recipients to shift resources to non-food 
purchases.  
All in all, I show that spending falls relatively less during recession for the target 
group relative to another as a result of the increase in government transfers. This is an 
important finding with the concerns magnified for disadvantaged households with low 
income and low assets at the time of economic downturn. In light of this, this paper sheds 
light on policy implications that increased government transfers can be one possible 
mechanism through which consumption of low income families can be protected. This study 
provides compelling evidence of SNAP’s pivotal role in improving food expenditures for 
households who would otherwise be at greater risk of food insecurity and lack of food 
choices, in the absence of the safety net program. In addition, the benefit increase definitely 
offered a cushion for vulnerable groups by expanding households’ budget to afford basic 
needs. 
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Figure 2.1 Maximum Monthly SNAP Allotment for a Family of 4 ($1994) 
 
    Source: Food and Nutrition Service, United States Department of Agriculture 
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Figure 2.2 SNAP benefit increase in the 2009 ARRA and a consumer’s choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 are directly adopted from Hoynes et al. (2014). Hoynes et al (2014) 
analyze the introduction of the SNAP program, while I analyze the increase in SNAP benefits. 
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Figure 2.3 SNAP Benefit Increase in the 2009 ARRA  
and Allocation of Food Expenditures 
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Table 2.1 Monthly SNAP Benefit Amount for a Family of 4 
Year 
Average Benefit  
for a family of 4 
Percent Change  
in Benefit level 
Oct 1994 - Sept 1995 $386  
Oct 1995 - Sept 1996 $397 2.8% 
Oct 1996 - Sept 1997 $400 0.75% 
Oct 1997 - Sept 1998 $408 2% 
Oct 1998 - Sept 1999 $419 2.7% 
Oct 1999 - Sept 2000 $426 1.7% 
Oct 2000 - Sept 2001 $434 1.9% 
Oct 2001 - Sept 2002 $452 4.1% 
Oct 2002 - Sept 2003 $465 2.9% 
Oct 2003 - Sept 2004 $471 1.3% 
Oct 2004 - Sept 2005 $499 5.9% 
Oct 2005 - Sept 2006 $506 1.4% 
Oct 2006 – Sept 2007 $518 2.4% 
Oct 2007 – Sept 2008 $542 4.6% 
Oct 2008 – March 2009 $588 8.5% 
April 2009 – Sept 2009 $668 13.6% 
Oct 2009 – Oct 2013 $668 0% 
Nov 2013 – Sept 2014 $632 -5.4% 
 
 
 Source: Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Monthly SNAP Benefit Increase from the 2009 ARRA  
Household size Increase Household size Increase 
1 $24 5 $95 
2 $44 6 $114 
3 $63 7 $126 
4 $80 8 $144 
* For each extra person, a household receives $18. 
 Source: Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture 
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Table 2.3 [Main Results] Effects of the 2009 SNAP Benefit Increase on Households’ Expenditures:  
Difference-in-Differences Estimation using CEX 2007−2011 
 
 
(A) Sample: SNAP participants (Treatment) Compared to Non-participants with Income ≤ 250% of the Poverty Line (Control) 
  
QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE ($2009) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
 
 
Total 
Expenditure 
Food 
Food at 
home 
Food away Housing Shelter Utility 
Transporta
tion 
Entertainmen
t 
Personal 
care 
Tobacco 
SNAP 
 
 
-1,399.89*** 
[145.871] 
-265.69*** 
[32.257] 
-131.62*** 
[25.242] 
-133.92*** 
[17.266] 
-670.83*** 
[63.041] 
-454.77*** 
[42.569] 
-123.02*** 
[16.500] 
-342.82*** 
[99.413] 
-108.55*** 
[19.523] 
-18.15*** 
[2.346] 
61.17*** 
[10.441] 
After ARRA 
 
 
-369.68 
[319.967] 
-53.04 
[55.273] 
-62.71 
[39.196] 
9.66 
[33.872] 
-115.68 
[134.332] 
-16.74 
[95.619] 
-58.09** 
[29.290] 
-154.62 
[213.565] 
11.06 
[37.320] 
-2.73 
[5.204] 
5.62 
[16.704] 
SNAP* 
After ARRA 
 
 
393.48** 
[169.504] 
121.48*** 
[38.224] 
119.42*** 
[31.189] 
2.07 
[19.0033] 
165.57** 
[76.628] 
112.41** 
[55.359] 
36.80* 
[20.391] 
39.44 
[111.356] 
67.69*** 
[22.604] 
5.72* 
[3.079] 
-16.80 
[13.651] 
Observation 
 
11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 
R-squared 
 
0.208 0.254 0.316 0.064 0.210 0.163 0.324 0.040 0.039 0.048 0.044 
 Note: These are coefficients from estimating equation (1). Regressions include demographic variables, month and year dummies. Sampling weight is used.  
 Column (3) and (4) are subcategories of Column (2). Column (6) and (7) are subcategories of Column (5).  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(B) Sample: Households with Income ≤ 130% of the Poverty Line (Treatment) Compared to those with 130%< Income ≤ 250% (Control) 
 Note: These are coefficients from estimating equation (1). Regressions include demographic variables, month and year dummies. Sampling weight is used.  
 Column (3) and (4) are subcategories of Column (2). Column (6) and (7) are subcategories of Column (5).  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE ($2009)   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
 
 
Total 
Expenditure 
Food 
Food at 
home 
Food 
away 
Housing Shelter Utility Transportation Entertainment 
Personal 
care 
Tobacco 
Low Income 
 
 
-1,561.72*** 
[129.147] 
-210.46*** 
[25.300] 
-111.71*** 
[18.846] 
-98.64*** 
[15.325] 
-603.73*** 
[55.496] 
-348.84*** 
[41.090] 
-141.37*** 
[12.101] 
-574.49*** 
[87.352] 
-131.89*** 
[24.961] 
-11.11*** 
[2.208] 
-4.59 
[6.666] 
After ARRA 
 
 
-462.63 
[327.080] 
-65.07 
[55.199] 
-70.33* 
[40.122] 
5.23 
[32.892] 
-133.37 
[137.934] 
-48.40 
[96.202] 
-50.91* 
[30.222] 
-238.35 
[219.668] 
-4.44 
[40.172] 
-0.45 
[5.563] 
12.83 
[17.366] 
Low Income 
* After 
ARRA 
 
 
422.13*** 
[156.569] 
83.52*** 
[32.050] 
71.22*** 
[24.299] 
12.31 
[18.747] 
129.14* 
[69.457] 
121.79** 
[53.448] 
8.30*** 
[16.034] 
211.61** 
[107.718] 
66.13** 
[27.719] 
-1.74 
[3.091] 
-19.18* 
[10.073] 
Observation  11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 
R-squared  0.217 0.255 0.317 0.061 0.214 0.162 0.334 0.044 0.042 0.048 0.039 
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Table 2.4 [Placebo Test] Years before ARRA: Households’ Expenditures Before (2007) and After (2008)  
 
(A) Sample: SNAP participants (Treatment) Compared to Non-participants with Income ≤ 250% of the Poverty Line (Control) 
 
  
QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE ($2009) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
 
 
Total 
Expenditure 
Food 
Food at 
home 
Food away Housing Shelter Utility 
Transportat
ion 
Entertainm
ent 
Personal 
care 
Tobacco 
SNAP 
 
 
-1,388.63*** 
[232.894] 
-295.80*** 
[48.279] 
-155.86*** 
[35.532] 
-139.79*** 
[29.165] 
-748.29*** 
[88.170] 
-496.67*** 
[63.963] 
-142.64*** 
[24.108] 
-187.90 
[182.271] 
-139.77*** 
[29.122] 
-17.56*** 
[3.585] 
48.11*** 
[13.858] 
After 
 
 
39.69 
[204.027] 
-12.05 
[32.554] 
32.26 
[23.051] 
-44.26** 
[19.645] 
32.88 
[84.399] 
-1.54 
[60.737] 
39.87** 
[16.678] 
18.89 
[143.580] 
-35.88 
[34.202] 
1.85 
[2.979] 
0.79 
[8.380] 
SNAP * 
After 
 
 
123.71 
[271.935] 
86.38 
[60.106] 
61.81 
[46.795] 
24.55 
[32.933] 
235.04** 
[116.693] 
130.38 
[81.890] 
52.83* 
[31.120] 
-284.79 
[191.128] 
58.69 
[37.071] 
1.17 
[4.314] 
20.54 
[19.199] 
Observation 
 
5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 
R-squared 
 
0.198 0.256 0.313 0.070 0.213 0.172 0.324 0.039 0.035 0.051 0.056 
 Note: These are coefficients from estimating equation (1). Regressions include demographic variables, month and year dummies. Sampling weight is used.  
 Column (3) and (4) are subcategories of Column (2). Column (6) and (7) are subcategories of Column (5).  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(B) Sample: Households with Income ≤ 130% of the Poverty Line (Treatment) Compared to those with 130%< Income ≤ 250% (Control) 
  
QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE ($2009) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
 
 
Total 
Expenditure 
Food 
Food at 
home 
Food away Housing Shelter Utility 
Transportat
ion 
Entertainm
ent 
Personal 
care 
Tobacco 
Low Income 
 
 
-1,453.88*** 
[188.587] 
-238.55*** 
[39.142] 
-120.94*** 
[29.738] 
-117.50*** 
[24.557] 
-625.23*** 
[82.188] 
-384.90*** 
[61.481] 
-127.72*** 
[17.686] 
-429.10*** 
[134.300] 
-136.61*** 
[39.141] 
-10.98*** 
[3.363] 
-4.14 
[8.953] 
After 
 
 
58.12 
[247.086] 
-39.51 
[40.309] 
25.01 
[29.697] 
-64.47*** 
[23.332] 
-3.65 
[101.451] 
-47.81 
[75.066] 
49.45** 
[19.979] 
96.78 
[180.283] 
-33.25 
[43.373] 
1.54 
[3.575] 
5.05 
[10.614] 
Low Income 
* 
After 
 
 
-46.39 
[243.715] 
80.56* 
[48.370] 
33.40 
[36.230] 
47.16 
[29.031] 
139.95 
[106.183] 
129.67 
[80.096] 
-5.52 
[23.269] 
-285.36* 
[168.035] 
11.91 
[49.318] 
0.36 
[4.228] 
1.42 
[12.024] 
Observation 
 
5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 5,536 
R-squared 
 
0.209 0.257 0.314 0.070 0.217 0.172 0.332 0.046 0.037 0.050 0.047 
 Note: These are coefficients from estimating equation (1). Regressions include demographic variables, month and year dummies. Sampling weight is used.  
 Column (3) and (4) are subcategories of Column (2). Column (6) and (7) are subcategories of Column (5).  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5 [Placebo Test] Years after ARRA: Households’ Expenditures Before (2010) and After (2011)  
 
(A) Sample: SNAP participants (Treatment) Compared to Non-participants with Income ≤ 250% of the Poverty Line (Control) 
  
QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE ($2009) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
 
 
Total 
Expenditure 
Food 
Food at 
home 
Food away Housing Shelter Utility 
Transportat
ion 
Entertainm
ent 
Personal 
care 
Tobacco 
SNAP 
 
 
-1,154.32*** 
[154.801] 
-186.86*** 
[34.346] 
-34.85 
[29.334] 
-151.85*** 
[15.435] 
-577.48*** 
[71.857] 
-401.36*** 
[54.618] 
-93.61*** 
[20.303] 
-333.51*** 
[98.000] 
-29.65 
[18.275] 
-14.97*** 
[3.334] 
40.41*** 
[13.571] 
After 
 
 
-256.66** 
[119.772] 
-17.54 
[25.081] 
-5.67 
[18.098] 
-11.89 
[15.629] 
-120.95** 
[57.246] 
-111.79** 
[45.320] 
-11.44 
[13.061] 
-62.13 
[80.474] 
-14.68 
[15.490] 
-4.44 
[2.815] 
-7.02 
[9.350] 
SNAP * 
After 
 
 
180.60 
[203.743] 
61.70 
[47.274] 
32.34 
[40.406] 
29.35 
[21.772] 
65.58 
[97.599] 
76.99 
[75.625] 
-2.00 
[26.111] 
62.95 
[124.780] 
-19.26 
[25.714] 
2.73 
[4.402] 
12.15 
[19.691] 
Observation 
 
6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 
R-squared 
 
0.219 0.257 0.322 0.058 0.212 0.157 0.332 0.041 0.063 0.049 0.041 
 Note: These are coefficients from estimating equation (1). Regressions include demographic variables, month and year dummies. Sampling weight is used.  
 Column (3) and (4) are subcategories of Column (2). Column (6) and (7) are subcategories of Column (5).  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(B) Sample: Households with Income ≤ 130% of the Poverty Line (Treatment) Compared to those with 130%< Income ≤ 250% (Control) 
  
QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE ($2009) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
 
 
Total 
Expenditure 
Food 
Food at 
home 
Food away Housing Shelter Utility 
Transportat
ion 
Entertainm
ent 
Personal 
care 
Tobacco 
Low Income 
 
 
-1,314.49*** 
[157.653] 
-120.09*** 
[33.528] 
-35.32 
[22.448] 
-84.66*** 
[22.832] 
-566.01*** 
[74.691] 
-273.53*** 
[61.160] 
-152.84*** 
[16.945] 
-445.61*** 
[104.144] 
-70.58*** 
[20.999] 
-15.43*** 
[3.671] 
-20.07* 
[12.120] 
After 
 
 
-319.98** 
[147.403] 
20.74 
[30.461] 
16.83 
[23.624] 
3.88 
[17.110] 
-156.81** 
[68.466] 
-112.22** 
[52.350] 
-24.62 
[16.648] 
-137.93 
[105.343] 
-21.98 
[17.639] 
-6.58** 
[3.340] 
0.81 
[13.817] 
Low Income 
* 
After 
 
 
194.49 
[197.822] 
-47.36 
[42.073] 
-28.74 
[32.115] 
-18.61 
[24.349] 
93.55 
[91.809] 
32.12 
[72.171] 
23.62 
[22.210] 
172.63 
[135.886] 
4.84 
[24.713] 
5.24 
[4.462] 
-8.84 
[16.068] 
Observation 
 
6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 6,278 
R-squared 
 
0.227 0.258 0.323 0.054 0.215 0.154 0.343 0.044 0.067 0.051 0.039 
    Note: These are coefficients from estimating equation (1). Regressions include demographic variables, month and year dummies. Sampling weight is used.  
 Column (3) and (4) are subcategories of Column (2). Column (6) and (7) are subcategories of Column (5).  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.6 [Robustness Check] Effects of the 2009 SNAP Benefit Increase on Households’ Expenditures: 
Difference-in-Differences Estimation using CEX 2007−2011 
 
(A) Sample: Households’ Head Less than High School Degree (Treatment) Compared to those with High School Degree or more (Control) 
  
QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE ($2009) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
 
 
Total 
Expenditure 
Food 
Food at 
home 
Food away Housing Shelter Utility 
Transportat
ion 
Entertainm
ent 
Personal 
care 
Tobacco 
Low-Educ 
 
 
-2,204.66*** 
[165.121] 
-230.54*** 
[31.677] 
-56.02** 
[23.099] 
-174.37*** 
[19.478] 
-1,008.3*** 
[76.694] 
-634.23*** 
[56.067] 
-128.93*** 
[16.973] 
-627.38*** 
[105.148] 
-227.97*** 
[30.008] 
-24.85*** 
[3.003] 
56.53*** 
[9.146] 
After ARRA 
 
 
-310.39 
[318.453] 
-44.34 
[55.810] 
-41.22 
[39.337] 
-3.13 
[34.236] 
-79.54 
[131.587] 
-5.30 
[95.498] 
-45.29 
[28.998] 
-166.86 
[212.956] 
25.03 
[38.270] 
-2.44 
[5.208] 
9.62 
[16.630] 
Low-Educ * 
After ARRA 
 
 
25.84 
[174.023] 
63.93* 
[38.770] 
14.17 
[30.577] 
49.76** 
[20.899] 
-45.80 
[81.957] 
28.06 
[61.780] 
-29.74 
[20.558] 
69.40 
[110.042] 
-2.59 
[25.304] 
3.14 
[3.279] 
-30.47** 
[13.391] 
Observation 
 
11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 
R-squared 
 
0.198 0.247 0.314 0.055 0.198 0.154 0.318 0.038 0.037 0.044 0.039 
 Note: These are coefficients from estimating equation (1). Regressions include demographic variables, month and year dummies. Sampling weight is used.  
 Column (3) and (4) are subcategories of Column (2). Column (6) and (7) are subcategories of Column (5).  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
98 
 
(B) Sample: Households with Single Head (Treatment) Compared to those with Married Head (Control) 
 
  
QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE ($2009) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
 
 
Total 
Expenditure 
Food 
Food at 
home 
Food away Housing Shelter Utility 
Transportat
ion 
Entertainm
ent 
Personal 
care 
Tobacco 
Single 
 
 
-1,288.93*** 
[155.328] 
-240.11*** 
[33.328] 
-166.07*** 
[26.073] 
-74.00*** 
[18.606] 
-387.08*** 
[66.974] 
-206.39*** 
[49.843] 
-88.03*** 
[14.897] 
-550.07*** 
[104.214] 
-117.24*** 
[30.700] 
-4.21* 
[2.539] 
25.67*** 
[9.387] 
After ARRA 
 
 
-598.20* 
[346.719] 
-85.58 
[60.416] 
-71.28* 
[42.358] 
-14.31 
[38.078] 
-130.33 
[151.066] 
-23.97 
[106.829] 
-53.84* 
[31.978] 
-303.05 
[224.994] 
-6.94 
[43.120] 
1.28 
[5.544] 
6.71 
[17.369] 
Single * 
After ARRA 
 
 
461.86*** 
[177.481] 
87.16** 
[37.098] 
52.22* 
[28.314] 
34.94 
[21.373] 
63.95 
[80.247] 
39.16 
[61.576] 
3.09 
[17.759] 
238.48** 
[119.161] 
49.40 
[32.786] 
-4.76 
[3.303] 
-6.04 
[11.396] 
Observation 
 
11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 
R-squared 
 
0.199 0.248 0.314 0.055 0.198 0.154 0.318 0.039 0.037 0.044 0.038 
 Note: These are coefficients from estimating equation (1). Regressions include demographic variables, month and year dummies. Sampling weight is used.  
 Column (3) and (4) are subcategories of Column (2). Column (6) and (7) are subcategories of Column (5).  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(C) Sample: Households with Unemployed Head (Treatment) Compared to those with Employed Head (Control) 
  
QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE ($2009) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
 
 
Total 
Expenditure 
Food 
Food at 
home 
Food away Housing Shelter Utility 
Transportati
on 
Entertainm
ent 
Personal 
care 
Tobacco 
Single 
 
 
-894.14*** 
[129.785] 
-112.61*** 
[26.124] 
-31.34* 
[18.809] 
-81.16*** 
[16.079] 
-262.42*** 
[60.666] 
-219.99*** 
[44.662] 
-50.90*** 
[12.866] 
-356.59*** 
[85.111] 
-39.60 
[24.412] 
-10.85*** 
[2.271] 
8.64 
[7.145] 
After ARRA 
 
 
-421.70 
[321.756] 
-40.95 
[56.348] 
-50.82 
[39.800] 
9.87 
[34.740] 
-138.67 
[135.364] 
-44.65 
[96.159] 
-63.09** 
[29.385] 
-169.50 
[211.395] 
12.56 
[38.762] 
-3.15 
[5.251] 
-0.40 
[16.925] 
Single * 
After ARRA 
 
 
397.15** 
[165.374] 
36.51 
[33.257] 
43.22* 
[24.858] 
-6.71 
[19.463] 
166.22** 
[76.890] 
154.62*** 
[58.095] 
38.06** 
[17.347] 
61.11 
[109.868] 
40.38 
[26.841] 
4.79 
[3.355] 
11.10 
[10.915] 
Observation 
 
11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 11,814 
R-squared 
 
0.199 0.247 0.314 0.054 0.199 0.154 0.319 0.038 0.037 0.044 0.038 
 Note: These are coefficients from estimating equation (1). Regressions include demographic variables, month and year dummies. Sampling weight is used.  
 Column (3) and (4) are subcategories of Column (2). Column (6) and (7) are subcategories of Column (5).  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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[Appendix Tables] Summary Statistics: Treatment Group Pre- and Post-ARRA 
Table A2.1: Households Who Participated in SNAP Past 12 Months 
 
Pre-ARRA Post-ARRA Difference T-Statistics 
 
(N=955) (N=1519)     
Age of Head 38.94 39.00 0.06 0.13 
Head, Married 0.26 0.29 0.03 1.54 
Own Home 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.10 
Family Size 3.27 3.23 -0.04 -0.57 
Number of Earners 0.88 0.87 -0.01 -0.28 
Number of children less than 18 years old 1.57 1.48 -0.09 -1.46 
Head, Less than HS 0.36 0.32 -0.04** -2.24 
Head, HS grad 0.53 0.55 0.01 0.57 
Head, College Grad 0.11 0.14 0.03** 2.40 
Head, White 0.65 0.67 0.01 0.74 
Head, Black 0.30 0.27 -0.03 -1.35 
Head, Other race 0.05 0.06 0.01 1.15 
Head, Female 0.74 0.72 -0.02 -1.26 
Urban 0.92 0.94 0.02* 1.75 
Number of hours worked by Headper week 35.25 35.12 -0.13 -0.18 
Number of weeks worked by Head 18.46 18.46 0.00 0.00 
Social Security Income 1558.56 1757.09 198.53 1.14 
Supplemental Security Income 1318.02 1156.61 -161.41 -1.22 
Unemployment Compensation 3948.20 6555.10 2606.9*** 4.51 
Public Assistance Income 3128.56 2781.00 -347.56 -1.10 
Income from Child Support Payment 3226.47 3612.47 386.00 0.84 
Income from SNAP 1817.59 2018.86 201.3** 2.50 
Medicaid Receipt 0.83 0.88 0.05*** 2.80 
Medicare Receipt 0.21 0.20 -0.01 -0.45 
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Table A2.2: Households with Income ≤ 130% of the Poverty Line 
 
Pre-ARRA Post-ARRA Difference T-Statistics 
 
(N=2673) (N=3268)     
Age of Head 37.41 38.10 0.69** 1.96 
Head, Married 0.29 0.27 -0.01 -1.08 
Own Home 0.25 0.24 -0.01 -1.16 
Family Size 2.59 2.60 0.01 0.25 
Number of Earners 0.86 0.83 -0.04* -1.88 
Number of children less than 18 years old 1.02 1.00 -0.02 -0.65 
Head, Less than HS 0.26 0.25 -0.01 -1.31 
Head, HS grad 0.56 0.57 0.01 0.44 
Head, College Grad 0.17 0.18 0.01 0.93 
Head, White 0.73 0.72 -0.01 -0.83 
Head, Black 0.21 0.21 0.00 -0.14 
Head, Other race 0.06 0.07 0.01* 1.72 
Head, Female 0.61 0.61 -0.01 -0.56 
Urban 0.94 0.94 0.00 0.44 
Number of hours worked by Head per week 34.61 34.03 -0.58 -1.31 
Number of weeks worked by Head 22.61 20.64 -1.96*** -3.33 
Social Security Income 1343.39 1357.19 13.79 0.14 
Supplemental Security Income 677.43 633.24 -44.19 -0.71 
Unemployment Compensation 3770.75 6575.52 2804.77*** 6.14 
Public Assistance Income 2948.96 2910.77 -38.19 -0.12 
Income from Child Support Payment 3381.55 3732.46 350.91 0.83 
Income from SNAP 539.49 777.05 237.56*** 6.09 
Medicaid Receipt 0.75 0.78 0.04** 2.19 
Medicare Receipt 0.29 0.26 -0.03 -1.87 
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Appendix 2A. Items included in Each Expenditure Category in the CEX 
 
A.1 Food 
Spending on food includes food consumed at home (mainly through grocery shopping), and 
food eaten away from home. Alcoholic beverages are reported in a separate category. 
a. Food at home 
b. Food away from home 
 
A.2 Housing 
a. Shelter: For home owners, shelter cost includes mortgage interest, property taxes,
 maintenance, repairs, and insurance. For home renters, this includes rent for the r
ented dwelling. 
b. Utility: Fees for natural gas, electricity, fuels, telephone service, and water 
c. House operation: Domestic services, babysitting, and child day care 
d. House equipment: textiles, furniture, floor coverings, and home appliances 
 
A.3 Transportation 
a. Vehicle purchases 
b. Vehicle finance charges 
c. Gasoline and motor oil 
d. Maintenance and repairs 
e. Vehicle insurance 
f. Vehicle rental, and leases 
g. Public transportation 
 
A.4 Health 
a. Health insurance 
b. Medical services 
c. Prescription drugs 
d. Medical supplies 
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A.5 Entertainment 
a. Fees and admissions 
b. Televisions, radios, and sound equipment 
c. Pets, toys, and playground equipment, and others 
 
A.6 Other Expenditures 
a. Personal care products and services: products for hair, oral hygiene products, cos
metics and bath products, electric personal care appliances, etc. 
b. Education and Reading: tuition, fees, textbooks, and supplies 
c. Tobacco products 
d. Miscellaneous: safety deposit box rental, checking account fees, bank service cha
rges 
e. Cash contributions
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Chapter 3  
Are Household Food Expenditures 
Responsive to Entry onto the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is the federal 
government’s largest nutrition assistance program. SNAP provides participating low-
income families a monthly benefit in the form of Electronic Benefit Transfers (EBT) 
that can only be used to purchase food at participating retailers. During fiscal year 
2013, SNAP spending was a record $82.5 billion, with an average caseload of 47.7 
million people per month, about one out of every seven U.S. residents.  
Because of growing size of the program and unprecedented number of 
recipients on SNAP, there has been substantial policy interest in evaluating the effects 
of program on individual and family outcomes. Among a wide range of outcomes, 
SNAP’s effect on households’ food security has been highlighted in the literature. 
However, self-selection complicates efforts to evaluate the relationship between 
SNAP receipt and food insecurity because it is likely that households most in need of 
assistance are also the most likely to apply for benefits. In fact, Gundersen et al. 
(2008) and other studies have shown that low-income households who receive SNAP 
are more likely to report food insecurity than similar nonparticipating households (See
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Bartfeld & Dunifon, 2006; Gibson-Davis & Foster, 2006; Gundersen & Kreider, 2008; 
Jensen, 2002; Wilde, 2007; Wilde & Nord, 2005). In an attempt to address this issue, 
some recent studies use more sophisticated techniques, including instrumental variables 
approaches, and find a negative relationship between SNAP participation and food 
insecurity (Nord and Golla 2009; Mykerezi and Mills 2010; Ratcliffe et al. 2011; Shaefer 
& Gutierrez, 2013). Yet much remains to be learned about the relationship between 
SNAP and food insecurity.  
The mechanism by which SNAP would reduce food insecurity is through 
expanding recipient households’ food budgets. Accordingly, direct evidence of SNAP’s 
ameliorative effect should be apparent in the food expenditures of these households, pre- 
and post-SNAP entry. Do food expenditures rise, fall, or remain stable in the months 
following program entry? Do SNAP dollars replace or supplement out-of-pocket 
spending? What other changes happen to a family around the time of SNAP entry? We 
delve into these questions by adopting an event-study framework to draw a month-to-
month trends in food expenditures, before and after SNAP entry.  
We use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the only panel dataset with 
measures of both household food expenditures and SNAP participation by month. Taking 
advantage of the PSID’s panel structure, we create an event-study analysis sample 
identified by the month relative to the SNAP entry. We then use these observations to 
track trends in household food expenditures for the twelve months prior to SNAP entry, 
and the twelve months 3 following SNAP entry. Our findings suggest that the SNAP 
shields new entrants from a substantial fall in food expenditures. Even after controlling 
for demographic characteristics as well as time and state fixed effects, our event-study 
estimation reveals that total food expenditures show a stable and smooth trend in the 
months surrounding SNAP entry. This is found to be largely due to SNAP replacing a 
great share of households’ food budget after program entry. We also demonstrate that 
there are household shocks that co-occur with SNAP entry, such as new spells of 
unemployment or marital dissolution, suggesting that these shocks may trigger SNAP 
entry. 
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3.2 Background and Literature Review 
With an average monthly benefit of $159 per person and a maximum monthly 
benefit of $668 for a family of four, SNAP benefits increase the gross incomes of 
participating households by 39 percent, and by 45 percent for households with children 
(CBO report, April 2012). Therefore, we might expect that the SNAP would increase the 
food expenditures or overall purchasing power of participating households, and that this 
should reduce their food insecurity.  
Using a novel approach, Nord and Golla (2009) find evidence that suggests the 
food security of households deteriorates considerably in the few months prior to SNAP 
entry. They match households across two annual Current Population Survey Food 
Security Supplements (CPS FSS). They exploit food security measures, combined with 
monthly data on SNAP receipt, to identify two samples: 1) households that entered SNAP 
during the twelve months before the CPS FSS’s food security outcome is measured; and 
2) households that entered SNAP during the twelve months after they completed the 
survey. They find that household food insecurity increases during the few months prior to 
SNAP entry, and decreases in the months following.  
This improved food security after SNAP entry could mainly work through 
expanded resources available through SNAP dollars. Therefore, understanding the effects 
of SNAP on household food expenditures would bolster possible mechanisms for 
ameliorative effects of SNAP that are evident in broad literatures. SNAP benefits should 
improve food security through increased purchasing power for households’ food 
expenditures. A number of papers, mostly using data from 20 years ago or prior, have 
examined the impact of SNAP on household food expenditures, focusing on how much 
SNAP benefits increase household food expenditures compared to what would have 
occurred with an equal amount of cash. In a review of this literature, Fox et al. (2004) 
note that 32 studies utilized one of 4 three research approaches: 1) participant versus 
nonparticipant comparisons; 2) dose-response estimates; and 3) cash-out demonstrations 
that provide an experimental group with food stamps and a control group with an 
equivalent cash benefit. These studies consistently find that food stamp participants spend 
more on food than do comparable non-participants.  
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Fraker (1990) reports on a major cash-out randomized trial that finds that the 
marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamps is two to ten times higher than 
the estimated marginal propensity to consume food out of cash income. A more recent 
study by Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2007) exploits variation in the timing of the 
implementation of the Food Stamps Program (from 1963 to 1975) across counties. They 
find that the introduction of the program led to an overall increase in household total food 
expenditures among recipients, a decreased propensity to eat out, and mixed results for 
cash food expenditures (out-of-pocket expenditures).  
Yet, none of these studies dynamically examine how food expenditures patterns 
of households on SNAP change in the months before and after SNAP entry. The current 
paper employs an event-study methodology that follows month-to-month trends in food 
expenditures and provides further evidence of the dynamic relationship between SNAP 
entry and food expenditures.  
We may conjecture the trends in food expenditures follow that of food security, 
given that food expenditures and food security generally move in the same direction. 
Aligned with findings by Nord and Golla (2009) that food insecurity increased during the 
few months prior to SNAP entry, household food expenditures may also fall prior to 
SNAP entry, particularly if economic shocks, such as job loss or marital dissolution, are 
primary precipitators of new applications for benefits. Mabli & Ohls (2012, p. 5) say that 
“trigger events” reflect “a series of complex lag structures in both the eligibility and 
participation equations”. New entrants not previously receiving benefits may experience 
some changes in their circumstances that lead them to apply. Indeed, a number of studies 
find that SNAP is responsive to economic shocks such as job loss or marital dissolution 
(Mabli & Ohls, 2012; Hernandez & ZiolGuest, 2009). Thus, such shocks may be a 
primary cause for falling household food expenditures among new SNAP entrants.  
Do households’ food expenditures levels fluctuate prior to entering SNAP and 
recover afterwards? Does SNAP help households maintain constant food expenditures 
levels, replacing the household’s own expenditures on food 5 with public funding during 
times of need? To provide answers to these questions, we simulate household food 
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expenditures in the 12-months leading up to SNAP entry, and in the 12-month period 
after households enter the SNAP program using a nationally representative sample. 
 
3.3 Data and Measures 
The PSID is one of the world’s longest running household panel surveys. It is 
among the most important for social science research and for the evaluation of 
government policies. It is main source for information on changes in income and poverty 
over time, allowing longitudinal analysis of the income and consumption. Available 
waves were collected annually from 1968 through 1997, and then biennially after 1997 
up until 2011.  
The PSID is uniquely suited for our analysis because it is the only nationally 
representative panel dataset with both measures of household food expenditures and 
monthly SNAP program participation. We pool data from the four most recent waves of 
the PSID: 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007
42
.  In each wave, households are asked about 
average food expenditures at the time of the interview
43
, and monthly SNAP participation 
for the previous 2 calendar years and for the current year. For instance, in the 2001 wave, 
respondents report average food expenditures at the time of the interview, as well as 
month-by-month SNAP participation records from January 1999 through the interview 
month of 2001.  
Under-reporting of public transfer receipt in the PSID remains a limitation 
(Gundersen and Kreider, 2008). Meyer et al. (2009) provides estimates of the extent of 
under-reporting for ten transfer programs in five major nationally representative surveys, 
and finds that approximately 80 percent of food stamp dollars are reported in the PSID 
and the SIPP, while in the other surveys it is closer to 60 percent. For years beginning 
2003, a significant improvement is visibly detected in the PSID, with higher reporting 
rate than that of the SIPP.  
                                                        
42 We do not use the 2009 and 2011 waves because monthly SNAP participation questions were omitted from the 2009 
wave. 
43 Respondents are asked to report the amount they currently spend in an average week, but they are allowed to report 
annual or monthly amounts. We adjust the reported amount to be representative of monthly food expenditures to be 
consistent with monthly measures of SNAP participation. 
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Food expenditures are reported in three different categories in the PSID—food at 
home, food delivered, and food eaten out. If a household is currently a SNAP recipient, a 
separate question about the amount of the SNAP benefit is asked.
44
  Accordingly, we 
construct total food expenditures by summing 1) out-of-pocket spending on food at home 
(i.e. spending not using SNAP benefits), 2) food delivered, 3) food eaten out, and 4) 
SNAP benefit amount. Li et al. (2010) benchmark the quality of the PSID expenditures 
data by comparing them with data from Consumer Expenditures Survey (CE).  They find 
that the PSID expenditures compare favorably with those in the CE data, with spending 
amounts closely aligning in every expenditure category.  
The PSID simulates the USDA’s food needs standard for each household―an 
estimate of expected weekly food costs based on the “Low-cost food plan”45  for a family 
of the same size and composition. Food needs standard is widely used in order to account 
for family composition when measuring food expenditures (Zeldes, 1989; Stephen, 
2004). The PSID food needs variable, however, is measured in reference to the previous 
year. Because of different accounting periods of food expenditures and food needs, the 
food needs variable should not be used at face value when taking ratio between the two. 
Therefore, we re-constructed the food needs variable with family composition 
information as of the interview date, using the standard formula taken from USDA Low-
Cost Plan (Appendix 3B). 
Our main outcome variable is, therefore, the ratio between the food expenditures 
of the household, over that family’s USDA food needs standard, both of which are 
measured at the time of interview. By dividing a household’s food expenditures by its 
food needs threshold, we account for differences in the family size and composition of 
heterogeneous households. Moreover, the ratio is easy to interpret– if the ratio is greater 
than one, a household is spending more than the national average needed for food for the 
                                                        
44 See Appendix 3A for the question wording. 
45 The USDA provides guides for selecting nutritious diets at home at different cost levels  
o Thrifty 
o Low 
o Moderate 
o Liberal 
The Thrifty plan, which is the least costly of the four, is the basis for the SNAP benefits. The Low and Moderate 
programs provide appropriate diets for most people. The Liberal plan, which doubles the cost of the Thrifty plan, 
permits a greater variety than the other plans. We use the built-in variable in the PSID, food needs standard based on 
Low-cost Food Plan, for the analysis. 
110 
 
low-cost food plan by a household with its composition. If the ratio is less than one, vice 
versa. 
 
3.4 Methodology and Identification Strategy 
3.4.1 Construction of Analysis Sample 
We use food expenditures measures, combined with monthly data on SNAP 
receipt, to identify two samples: 1) households that entered SNAP during the twelve 
months before food expenditure outcome is measured (food expenditures are treated by 
SNAP); and 2) households that entered SNAP during the twelve months after they 
completed the survey (food expenditures are not treated by SNAP). 
This sample construction, however, could be complicated by the fact that a 
family’s monthly SNAP participation data is coming from two consecutive PSID waves 
that are two years apart. For example, if a household was interviewed in April 2001 for 
the 2001 PSID wave, monthly data on SNAP receipt for 2000 and early 2001 are 
obtained from the same wave. However, monthly data on SNAP receipt for later 2001 
and 2002 are obtained from 2003 PSID wave. 
We should note that not all families stay the same over the PSID waves. Some 
drop from the sample because of attrition.
46
 Others change family composition between 
waves. For example, families can split into two or more sub-families because of marriage 
or divorce. In order to avoid the results to be confounded by non-random family 
composition change across waves, we first restrict to households that do not split into 
multiple families across two waves.  This guarantees that monthly SNAP receipt 
information from two sequential PSID waves corresponds to the same family. It is 
assuring that the proportion of families that stayed the same with respect to its 
composition is relatively high across waves: 91% (2001 to 2003), 85% (2003 to 2005), 
87.5% (2005 to 2007), and 85.6% (2007 to 2009). 
The second restriction that we impose on our sample is that we focus on 
households that were not on SNAP for at least 12 months prior to the observed SNAP 
                                                        
46 The proportion of families who drop between waves is the following: 4.9% (2001 to 2003), 6.8% (2003 to 2005), and 
4.9% (2005 to 2007). 
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entry. This restriction provides an estimate of food expenditures, without contamination 
by households that cycle on and off of SNAP. Because we are interested in SNAP entry 
rather than SNAP participation, this restriction leads us to exclude families who use 
SNAP over long durations. We do not impose any restriction with respect to the duration 
of a family’s SNAP spell, once it starts—some households may have received SNAP for 
only 1 month, whereas others may have received benefits for 12 months or more.
47
 
To understand the effects of the two sample restrictions, we conducted a balance 
test of demographic variables between households included in our final analysis and 
households that are excluded due to the two sample restrictions. Table 3.1 presents the 
result of the test. Our final sample includes almost a third
48
 of all families ever reporting 
SNAP in the PSID waves. In some dimensions such as employment status and race, our 
final analysis sample is slightly more positively selected, but not considerably so. This is 
not a surprise since we limit to those who have no SNAP history for at least a year prior 
to the observed entry, which excludes static SNAP participants, who are more 
disadvantaged with respect to some observable characteristics. In terms of marital status, 
home ownership, and education, both groups look substantially similar to each other. 
Thus, our findings are based on estimates from a sample of relatively new SNAP entrants 
and may not reflect long-term static SNAP participants. Still, our sample consists of 
nearly a third of those ever reporting SNAP receipt in the PSID for the years under study. 
Given these results, it is likely that this study provides lower bounds of the food 
expenditures pattern, suggesting that the patterns may be more drastic when all SNAP 
recipients are taken into account. 
After the two restrictions imposed, finally, we group households according to the 
months between SNAP entry and the measurement of food expenditures. Households that 
entered SNAP 12 months before reporting food expenditures are grouped together; those 
entering SNAP 11 months before reporting food expenditures are grouped together; 
continuing until the final group consists of households entering SNAP 12 months after 
the food expenditures are measured. Thus, the study sample represents a progression of 
                                                        
47 In sensitivity analyses, we restrict the sample to households whose SNAP spells are at least 6 months or longer. 
Results remain substantively similar. 
48  About 60 percent of ever-receiving SNAP households are excluded due to 12-month–no-entry restriction, and 
additional 7 percent are excluded due to no-family composition change restriction. 
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independent families sorted on the timing of the observation when it reports food 
expenditures relative to the month of SNAP entry. 
Our unit of analysis is the household-SNAP spells.  As long as the conditions 
discussed above are met, households with multiple SNAP spells over the course of the 
four PSID waves can be included multiple times. The primary analysis sample consists of 
the 1,764  household-SNAP spells from 1,477 unique households.  
 
3.4.2 Analytic Methods: Event-Study Analysis Before and 
After SNAP Entry 
To explore the underlying trends, we simply plot the average food expenditures-
to-food needs ratio across months surrounding SNAP entry in Figure 3.1 as our 
descriptive analysis.  
We evaluate our descriptive trend in an event study specification to test the 
statistical significance of the association between food expenditures-to-needs ratio and 
months relative to SNAP entry. Specifically, equation (1) shows the event study model: 
(1)         (
Food Expenditures
Food Needs
)ht
= β0 + ∑ βi ∙ I(τht = i)
12
i=−12
+ π ∙ Xht + ρt + θ𝑦 + σ𝑠 + σs ∙ y + εht 
τht  denotes the number of months relative to the event of SNAP entry for 
household h interviewed in month t. It is defined so that τht = 0 if food expenditures are 
measured in the same month as the SNAP entry. For τht > 0, food expenditures are 
treated by SNAP. For instance, τht = 1 indicates food expenditures measured 1 month 
after SNAP entry. For τht < 0 , food expenditures are untreated by SNAP (i.e. food 
expenditures are measured before the program starts). When drawing plots, I omit the 
τht = 0 category as a reference group so that the βi  coefficients map out differences 
relative to the outcome at the time of SNAP entry. Our event study model includes fixed 
effects for state (σ𝑠), interview year (θ𝑦), and interview month (ρt) as well as state-
specific time trends (σs ∙ y). Given that the study period overlaps with a period of rapid 
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changes in the SNAP as well as other welfare programs, this set of variables is to absorb 
any state-specific or time-specific trend that could affect food expenditures differently. 
Moreover, it captures heterogeneity in SNAP spells as well as food expenditures that 
could be taking place at different points of time over the study period. Demographic 
characteristics of household heads
49
 such as race, education, sex, marital status, and 
employment status
50
 are also controlled for.  
In practice, demographic characteristics could be unbalanced in event-time in a 
way that interferes with identification. Therefore, we also run the event-study analysis 
with several fixed characteristics of heads as dependent variables. We show there is no 
significant trend in such characteristics as race, educational attainment, and age of head 
across months around SNAP entry. Job loss and marital dissolution are two major forms 
of household economic shocks, which may trigger SNAP entry and thus may be 
associated with changes in household food expenditures. With this in mind, we also 
report event-study analysis in which outcomes are not food expenditures, but are 1) 
whether a head of household is working, and 2) whether a head of household is married. 
 
3.5 Findings 
3.5.1 Descriptive Results 
Figure 3.1 simply plots the average ratio of household food expenditures-to-food 
needs for our analysis sample, in reference to the event of SNAP entry (denoted as 0 on 
the horizontal axis). Months prior to SNAP entry begin with −12 and progress to −1. 
Months following SNAP entry progress from +1 to +12. The solid line is total food 
expenditures (non-SNAP food expenditures plus SNAP benefit amount) as a ratio to food 
needs. Total food expenditures can be decomposed into two components. The dashed line 
is non-SNAP food expenditures, which are the sum of out-of-pocket spending on food at 
                                                        
49  The PSID defines household head as the person with the most financial responsibility and at least 16 years old. If 
this person is female and she has a husband in the family unit, then he is designated as Head. However, if the husband 
or boyfriend is incapacitated and unable to fulfill the functions of Head, then the family unit will have a female Head. 
50 Demographic controls include a set of indicators for a head being white, male, married, working, high school 
graduate, some college or more, and whether s/he owns home. 
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home, food delivered, and food eaten out. The dotted line indicates the size of SNAP 
benefits as a ratio to food needs.   
Examining first the non-SNAP food expenditures-to-needs ratio trend line, we see 
stability during the months prior to SNAP entry, with some slight fluctuations. 
Households a year away from SNAP entry have a ratio more than 1, suggesting that their 
food expenditures exceeds their USDA Low-cost food needs standard. The ratio holds 
substantively steady between .82 and 1.04. 
The ratio of non-SNAP food expenditures-to-needs is substantially lower after 
SNAP entry. It is .55 during the month of SNAP entry, and the ratio bottoms out 
following SNAP entry around .57. This estimate indicates that households in the first 
month of SNAP participation have non-SNAP food expenditures that are a little over half 
of their household’s basic food needs, substantially lower than households who are a few 
months away from entering SNAP. This pattern clearly reveals that SNAP recipients 
reduce their own out-of-pocket spending on food by replacing it with SNAP benefit. 
Lastly, the lowest dotted line plots the introduction of SNAP resources into the 
household’s food expenditures, rising from zero51, to accounting for an average of .36 of 
the household’s basic food needs a month after. This proportion seems reasonable, given 
the heterogeneity of our sample employed in this study, which includes very different 
household configurations that would be eligible for greater or smaller SNAP benefits. 
Note also that some households included in our post-SNAP sample may have cycled off 
SNAP during the months following entry.  
The effect of SNAP benefits on food expenditures are made clear by the wedge 
that opens up between the total food expenditures and the non-SNAP expenditures. While 
the non-SNAP food expenditures-to-food needs ratio is different considerably after the 
entry, overall food expenditures—which incorporate SNAP benefits—change far less, 
bottoming out at .80 for households three months following SNAP entry.  When SNAP 
dollars are accounted for, the ratio of total food expenditures-to-food needs rises 
somewhat among households as they are more months past SNAP entry, so that by 8 
                                                        
51 Even though we limit to the households who were not on SNAP for at least 12 months prior to the observed SNAP 
entry, there are some positive SNAP expenditure plotted in the months prior to SNAP entry in Figure 1. This is mainly 
due to reporting errors in the PSID: negligible number of households reported positive SNAP dollar amounts even if 
they said they did not receive any SNAP benefits. 
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months following SNAP entry, the ratio is well within the range of pre-SNAP food 
expenditures. Even then, though, SNAP accounts for a considerable amount of the food 
expenditures of the average households. In essence, the SNAP benefits visibly appear to 
act as a “safety net” for households who have recently entered the program, cushioning 
them from the extent of a possible negative shock in food expenditures that they might 
otherwise have faced. 
 
3.5.2 Event Study 
3.5.2.1 Food Expenditures-to-Food Needs Ratio 
Next we test the relationship between our key outcome, the ratio of food 
expenditures-to-food needs, and months relative to SNAP entry, using a multivariate 
framework. We estimate using the event-study methodology in an effort to control for 
various demographic characteristics of household heads. We also include time and state 
fixed effect so that the analysis is not confounded by seasonal trends or particular state 
characteristics. 
Figure 3.2 plots the regression coefficients 𝛽𝑖 from equation (1), where i ranges 
from −12 to +12 months, separately for three different food expenditures outcomes. Since 
the month of SNAP entry (i=0) is omitted as the reference month, the 𝛽𝑖  coefficients 
represents the difference in food expenditures-to-needs ratio in month i, relative to the 
level at the SNAP entry. For example, the coefficient .36 on non-SNAP expenditures a 
month prior to SNAP entry implies the following: non-SNAP food expenditures account 
for a higher share of the household’s basic food needs in a month prior to SNAP entry 
than in the month of SNAP entry, by 36 percent. The observed decrease in non-SNAP 
food expenditures-to-needs ratio that starts from two months prior to SNAP entry is 
surprisingly consistent with current SNAP application system: In almost all states, SNAP 
offices make a decision on approval of an applicant’s eligibility within 30 days of 
application (or within 7 days for applicants who qualify for "expedited" SNAP benefits). 
This event-study plot affirms that the descriptive trend in Figure 3.1 is also 
statistically supported even after controlling for households’ demographics, time trend 
and state characteristics. The non-SNAP food expenditures-to-food needs ratio changes 
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dramatically around the time of SNAP entry and levels off during the following months 
after SNAP program. The total food expenditures-to-needs ratio also fluctuates across the 
months surrounding SNAP entry, but the change is much less than that of non-SNAP 
expenditures. Overall, total food expenditures shows a relatively stable and smooth trend 
across all event times, suggesting the role of SNAP as a safety-net program for low-
income households. 
3.5.2.2 Co-Occurrence of Economic Shocks at the Time of SNAP Entry 
Estimates presented in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 are consistent with previous 
research which finds that many households experience economic shocks, prior to SNAP 
entry. Figure 3.3 plots the proportion of households in which the head is currently 
working. Note that the level of outcome is normalized to zero at the time of entry, thus 
estimates in other event months are changes relative to the entry month. Before SNAP 
participation, the proportion of households with a working head is greater by 10 to 30 
percentage point compared to the fraction at the time of SNAP entry. But it starts to 
lower substantially beginning two months prior to SNAP entry. We see a slow and 
gradual increase in the proportion of households with a working head in the post-SNAP 
sample. 
  A similar pattern is observed for marital status in Figure 3.4. Three months prior 
to SNAP entry, the proportion of married household heads is higher by 30 percentage 
points. The fraction of married head hits the lowest point right before SNAP entry. High 
levels of marital dissolution just before program entry likely lead these families to seek 
governmental transfer thereafter. Both Figures 3 and 4 suggest that program entry is 
likely to be preceded by household economic shocks. 
Some may be concerned about any possibility of unbalanced nature of pre- and 
post-SNAP sample, which could possibly confound the results. In Figures A3.1, A3.2 and 
A3.3, we plot the similar plots but replace the outcomes with fixed characteristics of 
household heads: indicators for a head being black, years of schooling, and age of a head, 
respectively. The Appendix Figures show that all estimates are not distinguishable from 
zero with large standard errors for all months before and after SNAP entry. This reveals 
that there is no statistically significant underlying trend in any of these fixed 
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characteristics across pre- and post-SNAP groups, giving us confidence that our findings 
are not driven by the nature of unbalanced characteristics of two samples. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Building upon a wide body of empirical literature that evaluates the impact of 
SNAP on economic, social, and health outcomes, this study provides direct evidence of 
SNAP, which is immediately reflected on household food expenditures. Taking 
advantage of the most recent PSID data available, with measures of both food 
expenditures and monthly SNAP participation, we depict the month-to-month food 
expenditures trend with an event-study analysis. 
Our estimates uncover the dynamic relationship between food expenditures and 
SNAP entry. First, we start with descriptive analysis, simply plotting the average food 
expenditures-to-needs ratio for the 12 months leading up to SNAP entry to 12 months 
after SNAP entry. Then we confirm that this descriptive pattern is supported with 
statistical significance in the multivariate event-study analyses. Both descriptive and 
multivariate analyses consistently tell similar story over the course of 2-year time frame 
and identify a potentially ameliorative effect of SNAP. Specifically, we observe the 
estimated non-SNAP food expenditures becomes lower substantially at the time of SNAP 
entry, while changes in total food expenditures are buffered by increased expenditures 
using SNAP, suggesting a role of SNAP a protection against economic shocks.   
Furthermore, we replace food expenditure outcome with economic status of a 
household head to discover any changes happening to a family around the time of SNAP 
entry. We find a strong relationship between time to SNAP entrance and the proportion 
of households with working and married heads. This offers evidence that the timing of 
SNAP entry often coincides with the occurrence of household economic shocks. 
In essence, the SNAP benefits visibly appear to act as a “safety net” for 
households who have recently entered the program, cushioning them from the extent of a 
negative shock in food expenditures that they might otherwise have faced. This study 
offers a credible estimate to what extent SNAP may supplement participants’ income and 
help them expand their food budget accordingly. Because of the program’s large size and 
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prevalence, there is substantial policy interest in evaluating its effectiveness. This study, 
thus, provides compelling evidence of SNAP’s pivotal role in improving food 
expenditures for households who would otherwise be at greater risk of food insecurity 
and lack of food choices, in the absence of this safety net program. 
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 Table 3.1: Comparison of Demographic Characteristics Between 
Families in Final Sample and Those Excluded 
     Demographic variables In Sample Excluded Difference T statistics 
Age of head 37.5 39.8 -2.3 -5.3 
     Head is male 0.53 0.45 0.07 4.6 
     Number of children 1.3 1.6 -0.3 -7.2 
     Head is married 0.27 0.26 0.01 0.98 
     Own home 0.31 0.31 0 0.07 
     Head working 0.6 0.55 0.05 3.5 
     Head white 0.33 0.29 0.04 2.7 
     Head black 0.59 0.64 -0.04 -2.8 
     Head's education 11.6 11.4 0.18 2.2 
     Observations       1,477        2,989      
     Source: Authors’ analysis of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 
waves 
Note: Two sample restrictions, 1) 12-month–no-SNAP-entry, and 2) No family split across two 
consecutive PSID waves, result in some observations excluded from the analysis sample (2,989 
observations). In Table 1, we implement a balance test between our analysis sample (1,477 
observations) and those who are excluded (2,989 observations). 
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Figure 3.1 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves 
Note: Estimates are the mean ratio of household food expenditures-to-food needs, broken down into SNAP 
and non-SNAP expenditures. It plots a mean outcome at each time point, unadjusted for controls. 
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Figure 3.2 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves 
Note: It plots the regression coefficients 𝛽𝑖 from equation (1) with the month of SNAP entry (i=0) omitted 
as a reference group. The coefficient 𝛽𝑖 for each month represents the food expenditures-to-needs ratio 
relative to the level at the month of SNAP entry, which is normalized to zero. Month, year, and state fixed 
effects as well as state-specific time trends are included. The regressions control for head’s education, race, 
sex, marital and employment status, and whether the household owns home. 
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Figure 3.3 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves 
Note: It plots the regression coefficients 𝛽𝑖 from equation (1) with the month of SNAP entry (i=0) omitted 
as a reference group in the event-study model. Each data point represents the difference in the proportion of 
working head relative to that at the month of SNAP entry, which is normalized to zero. Month, year, and 
state fixed effects as well as state-specific time trends are included. 
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Figure 3.4 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves 
Note: It plots the regression coefficients βi from equation (1) with the month of SNAP entry (i=0) omitted 
as a reference group in the event-study model. Each data point represents the difference in the proportion of 
married head relative to that at the month of SNAP entry, which is normalized to zero. Month, year, and 
state fixed effects as well as state-specific time trends are included. 
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Figure A3.1 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves 
Note: It plots the regression coefficients βi from equation (1) with the month of SNAP entry (i=0) omitted 
as a reference group in the event-study model. Each data point represents the difference in the proportion of 
black head relative to that at the month of SNAP entry, which is normalized to zero. Month, year, and state 
fixed effects as well as state-specific time trends are included. 
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Figure A3.2 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves 
Note: It plots the regression coefficients βi from equation (1) with the month of SNAP entry (i=0) omitted 
as a reference group in the event-study model. Each data point represents the difference in years of 
schooling of head relative to that at the month of SNAP entry, which is normalized to zero. Month, year, 
and state fixed effects as well as state-specific time trends are included. 
  
129 
 
Figure A3.3 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves 
Note: It plots the regression coefficients 𝛽𝑖 from equation (1) with the month of SNAP entry (i=0) omitted 
as a reference group in the event-study model. Each data point represents the difference in age of head 
relative to that at the month of SNAP entry, which is normalized to zero. Month, year, and state fixed 
effects as well as state-specific time trends are included. 
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Appendix 3A 
SNAP Participation and Benefit Amount Questionnaire in PSID 
 
In PSID interview, they ask about SNAP monthly participation and SNAP benefit amount of the previous 
two years and current year of the interview (For example, in 2001 PSID, interviewers ask about 1999, 
2000, and 2001 SNAP participation status). Here, we show the actual 2001 PSID questionnaire. Same 
questions are asked in 2003 through 2007 PSID. 
 
- Did you (or anyone in your family) use government food stamps at any time in [year]? 
1 YES  5 NO  8 DK  9 NA; refused 
- How many dollars' worth of stamps did you get in [year]?—AMOUNT 
.01 - 999,996.99  Actual amount 
999,997.00           $999,997 or more 
999,998.00           DK 
999,999.00           NA; refused 
.00                        Inap: did not receive food stamps in [year] 
- How many dollars' worth of stamps did you get in [year]?--TIME UNIT 
3 Week 
4 Two weeks 
5 Month 
6 Year 
7 Other 
8 DK 
9 NA; refused 
0 Inap.: did not receive food stamps in [year] 
- During which months did you receive food stamps?--JANUARY [year] 
1 YES  9 NA; DK   
0 Inap.: food stamps not used during this month; received no food stamps in [year] 
 
- During which months did you receive food stamps?--FEBRUARY [year] 
- During which months did you receive food stamps?--MARCH [year] 
... 
 
- During which months did you receive food stamps?--DECEMBER [year] 
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Appendix 3B  
 
How to Construct Annual USDA Needs Standard Variable 
 
1. Estimate the weekly food cost for each person according to age and sex at 1967 prices. These 
values are based on USDA Low-Cost Plan estimates of weekly food costs, then are summed for 
the family as it was at the time of the interview 
 
Individual Food Standard (Low Cost) 
$3.9 for both males and females under age 4 
$4.6 for both males and females under age 4-6 
$5.5 for both males and females under age 7-9 
$6.4 for males age 10-12 
$6.3 for females age 10-12 
$7.4 for males age 13-15 
$6.9 for females age 13-15 
$8.7 for males age 16-20 
$7.2 for females age 16-20 
$7.5 for males age 21-35 
$6.5 for females age 21-35 
$6.9 for males age 36-55 
$6.3 for females age 36-55 
$6.3 for males age 56 and older 
$5.4 for females age 56 and older 
 
2. Multiply this by 52 to convert to an annual amount and further adjust for economies of scale by 
USDA rules as follows: 
 
Single person: add 20% 
Two persons: add 10% 
Three persons: add 5% 
Four persons: no change 
Five persons: deduct 5% 
Six or more persons: deduct 10% 
 
3. An additional adjustment for diseconomies of small households was made as follows: 
4.89 times the food needs for single persons 
3.70 times the food needs for two-person units 
              3.00 times the food needs for all other units 
 
 
 
